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This thesis is an initial examination of the Navy's Sea College Program (SCP) that
was offered as an enlistment incentive in fiscal 1987. The research attempts to determine
if the SCP had a positive influence on the number or "quality" of enlistments into the
Navy's general detail (GENDET) personnel ratings by examining the records of recruits
from fiscal 1983 to 1989. Levels of recruit "quality" were measured during the time the
SCP was offered using mean percentile scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT) and scores on SCREEN, a method for estimating an individual's potential for
successful service. A literature review was also undertaken to identify existing informa-
tion on the value of an educational benefit plan as an enlistment incentive. The results
of the research show that enlistments into GENDET ratings increased when the SCP
was offered, especially for the Fireman rating. In addition, the results reveal that the
level of recruit quality significantly improved in the Seaman and Airman ratings. It ap-
pears that the SCP was moderately successful in helping the Navy to recruit high-quality
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With the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the Services could no
longer rely on the mechanism of the draft to bring conscripts and draft-motivated "vol-
unteers" into the enlisted ranks. The Services were required to compete with industry
and civilian education institutions on a new and far more aggressive level. Military
manpower planners, by necessity, developed innovative and effective programs that were
designed to attract sufficient numbers of young men and women into uniformed service.
Concurrently, advances in technology are being applied in the services, especially in
the area of combat systems. The "advanced" Talos Terrier, Tartar air defense systems
are being replaced with the "AEGIS" system, incorporating not only anti-air defense but
also anti-surface and anti-subsurface weapons into a total ship weapon system. Cruise
missile technology has changed the face of surface and strike warfare. The increase in
technological applications has led to the need for proportionately more high-quality
youths.
To attract these high-quality youths, the services began to realize that this group
must be offered a greater inducement to enlist. According to human capital theory, and
all other things being equal, the high-quality youths would enlist only if the value of
benefits realized by them were greater than the cost to them. Educational benefits pro-
grams are one of the most influential enlistment incentives, shown to be effective time
and again in numerous surveys of youth and new recruits. Therefore, since the start of
the all-volunteer military, much attention has been directed at developing educational
programs that would appeal to high-quality youths.
B. THESIS AREA OF RESEARCH
This thesis examines the recruiting of non-prior service (NPS) high-quality males to
the U.S. Navy, and the impact that the Sea College Program (SCP) might have had on
enlistments.
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
Only NPS high-quality males are considered since the Sea College Program was
limited to this group. The analysis involves recruitment during fiscal 1984 to 1989. Data
from fiscal 1985 are not included because of non-availability. The Sea College program
was offered to new recruits from 1 April 1986 to 4 December 1987.
D. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH
This research of the Navy Sea College Program is exploratory in nature since there
is a lack of published studies regarding the program. There is, however, a vast repository
of published knowledge dealing with the enlistment decision and with educational bene-
fits in particular. The thesis is grounded largely on studies dealing with the Army Col-
lege Fund. While it may not be possible to extrapolate the findings from the Army
College Fund studies and apply them to the SCP, they do provide a framework within
which an analysis of the SCP might be conducted.
It was not possible to observe the behavior of recruits who would actually attend
college and avail themselves of their benefits. As a matter of fact, some recruits enlisting
under the Sea College Program are not expected to complete their initial obligated ser-
vice until 1990. Since it has not been determined which recruits have applied for and
are using their benefits, the study focuses on the quality and numbers of recruits entering
the Navy and not with the cost-effectiveness of the program.
Another possible limitation of the research relates to the fact that only accessions
are analyzed on an individual level and not the number of new contracts. "Accessions"
are enlistees who have reported for basic recruit training, while "new contract enlistees"
includes persons who have not yet begun active duty. An analysis that examines new
contract enlistments may provide a better indication of the appeal of the SCP as a re-
cruiting tool of young people.
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research attempts to examine two enlistment issues. The first is to see if the
SCP was successful in attracting high-quality youths into the Navy. The second is to
see if the SCP had any role as a market-expanding tool. That is, did it provide an
enlistment incentive to young people who would not have enlisted otherwise.
The primary research question is whether the Navy Sea College Program had any
impact on the number of enlistments of NPS, high-quality males into the programs for
which it was targeted.
Secondary research questions are:
• Did the SCP have any significant impact on the quality of recruits entering the
targeted programs?
• Did the level of enlistments in any other program change during the time the SCP
was offered?
• Did the level of recruit quality in the other programs change during the time the
SCP was offered?
• Did the level of enlistments and quality change in any of the ten Department of
Defense (DoD) occupational areas over the time the SCP was offered?
F. DATA BASE
The first data base used in this thesis is the Personalized Recruiting for Immediate
and Delayed Enlistment System (PRIDE), obtained from Navy Recruiting Command.
The PRIDE system is a management and control tool of the recruiting process that al-
lows the Navy to:
• match the qualifications of the accession against the qualifications of the enlistment
program:
• control the allocation of training resources by assigning the accession to A school;
and
• identify the jobs for which an accession is best suited based on his or her quali-
fications.
The second data base used is the Enlistment Marketing Analysis, also obtained from
Navy Recruiting Command. This time series cross-sectional data file contains economic
information from each of the 41 Naval Recruiting Districts (NRDs) collected quarterly
for fiscal 1985 to 1988, and was used to model new contract enlistments.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter II presents the history of the use of educational benefits by the military.
The historical application and revision of the G.I. Bill, the implementation of the Vet-
erans' Educational Assistance Program, and the development of the Montgomery G.I.
Bill are presented.
Chapter III provides a review of literature that pertains to this research. The review
looks at various components of the enlistment decision model, such as advertising, eco-
nomic factors, and human capital theory. Published studies dealing with educational
benefit programs and their results are also examined.
Chapter IV is the first of two chapters dealing with data analysis. In this chapter,
an analysis of the PRIDE data base is presented. The details of data file construction,
variable construction and modification, and methodology used in the frequency analysis
are provided. In addition, results by targeted general detail personnel ratings are pre-
sented.
Chapter V is the second chapter concerned with data analysis, and it is limited to a
discussion of the results of a multivariate regression of the Enlistment Marketing Anal-
ysis data base. The chapter provides information regarding the construction and se-
lection of variables used in the model. The identification and correction of several
statistical conditions are discussed. The results of the model are presented and the effect
of the SCP on new contract enlistments is examined.
The final chapter presents conclusions concerning the primary and secondary re-
search questions. The policy implications of the findings are then discussed. A number
of recommendations for further research are also offered for consideration.
II. A REVIEW OF VETERANS7 EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
A. GENERAL
The current educational assistance program can trace its history back to the original
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, more commonly known as the "G.I. Bill." With
the end of World War II approaching, members of the armed forces were of special
concern to the national leadership because they would eventually comprise one-quarter
of the work force [Ref. 1: p. 1].
The original G.I. Bill was influenced by several major concerns that had been ex-
pressed during the closing months of the war. Concerns that were prevalent in late 1944
and recorded by the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions in 1956, were as
follows [Ref. 1: p. 1]:
• The welfare of demobilized veterans thrust upon an economy in the midst of re-
conversion to peacetime activity.
• The stability of the economy and the possibility of a postwar depression.
• The stability of our political institutions and the effect millions of disgusted veter-
ans might have on the government.
• The educational deficit that had occurred as a result of taking many young people
out of schools and sending them to war.
• Runaway demands for pensions and other benefits that might swamp the economy
beneath an unbearable load.
The major purposes in creating the more recent successor to the G.I. Bill, the Vet-
erans' Educational Assistance Program (established following the end of the draft), is
stated in 3S U.S.C. 1651 as follows [Ref. 2: p. 533]:
• Enhance and make more attractive service in the Armed Forces.
• Extend the benefits of higher education to qualified and deserving young people
who might not otherwise be able to afford it.
• Provide vocational readjustment and restore lost educational opportunities to those
service men and women whose careers had been interrupted or impeded by active
duty after 31 January 1955.
• Aid such persons in attaining the vocational and educational status they might
normally have aspired to and attained had they not served their country.
It can be seen from the previous lists of concerns and purposes that a significant
change has occurred in how veterans' benefits are employed by the government. This
change coincides with the expiration of the draft and the shift to the all-volunteer mili-
tary force in 1973. Prior to 1973, G.I. Bill educational benefits were offered to com-
pensate the veteran for hardships he or she had endured while serving in the Armed
Forces [Ref. 3]. After 1973, educational assistance programs were viewed as a major
way of attracting high-quality young men and women to serve in the military [Ref. 4].
The desire to attract high-quality youths increased significantly with the extreme re-
cruiting difficulties faced during the period of the late 1970s [Ref. 5].
This chapter reviews the educational assistance programs that have been offered to
service men and women, since 1944. The programs are divided into two groups. The
first group incorporates non-contributory plans and the more traditional G.I. Bills. The
second group includes the contributory programs. The more recent educational assist-
ance programs also are presented here.
B. NON-CONTRIBUTORY EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS PROGRAMS
1. The World War II G.I. Bill
The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (Public Law 346) was enacted by
the 78th Congress and became law on 22 June 1944. The bill applied to veterans who
served in the Armed Forces between 16 September 1940 and 25 July 1947 [Ref. 6: pp.
19-24]. The program ended, with minor exceptions, on 25 July 1956 [Ref. 2: p. 533].
The bill provided financial support for a minimum of one year of training plus
one month for each month of active duty up to forty-eight months. The veteran's tui-
tion, fees, books, and supplies up to a maximum of S500 per school year were paid di-
rectly by the Veterans Administration (VA). The veteran could use the tuition allowance
at an accelerated rate to cover educational costs if they exceeded the S500 limit. The
accelerated rate was one day of entitlement for each S2.10 paid.
The veteran received a monthly subsistence allowance of S50, which was in-
creased to S65 in 1946 and increased again to S75 in 1948. By statute, benefits were
curtailed if the veteran's monthly income exceeded SI 75 (S200 if he or she had depen-
dents). In 1948, the monthly limit was increased to S210 if the veteran had no depen-
dents, S270 for one dependent, and S290 for two or more dependents.
The full-time benefits for college students were based on a minimum of twelve
semester hours. Additionally, veterans were permitted to apply benefits to avocational
courses; however, this was banned in 1948. Veterans were required to begin their edu-
cation within four years of their release from the service. They were eligible to draw
benefits for nine years following discharge.
2. Korean Conflict G.I. Bill
The second G.I. Bill (Public Law 550) was passed by the 82nd Congress and
became effective on 20 August 1952 [Ref. 6: p. 19]. Veterans who served in the Armed
Forces during the "Korean Conflict" were covered by this bill. For the purposes of this
legislation, the Korean Conflict was considered to have started on 27 June 1950 and to
have ended on 31 January 1955. The ending date for persons who were on active duty
on 31 January 1955 was postponed until their first discharge or release from active duty.
The veteran could begin his or her education within three years of discharge and had
eight years of eligibility. In any event, the program was terminated on 31 January 1965
[Ref. 2: p. 533].
The program did not permit direct payments of education costs as did the World
War II G.I. Bill. Instead, the veteran received the benefit as an "education assistance"
allowance, or stipend, which was paid directly to the veteran. The purpose of the stipend
was to meet, in part, living expenses and educational costs.
The second G.I. Bill provided educational benefits at a rate of one and one-half
times the period on active duty. The maximum period of entitlement was generally
limited to three years. The minimum number of semester hours required of the Korean
veterans was set at fourteen. The veteran received a monthly allowance of SI 10 if he or
she was a full time student with no dependents. If the veteran had one dependent, the
monthly allowance was SI 35 a month; and if the veteran had two or more dependents,
the allowance was increased to SI 60.
3. Cold War G.I. Bill
The Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-358) is the
basic G.I. Bill for veterans of the post-Korean conflict or "Cold War" period. The law
became effective 1 June 1966 and covers service after 31 January 1955. This bill was the
first to have as one of its stated purposes the goal of "enhancing and making more at-
tractive service in the Armed Forces of the United States" [Ref. 2: p. 533].
This bill provides education benefits at the same rate (one and one-half) as its
predecessor; however, the maximum of thirty-six months of entitlements was available
after completion of only 18 months of service. Veterans were eligible to use their bene-
fits if they had received a discharge other than dishonorable and served on active duty
for more than 180 days, any part of which may have occurred after 31 January 1955.
The veteran who had been discharged or released from active duty because of
a service-connected disability after 31 January 1955 was also eligible for educational
benefits. The eligibility in this case was unaffected by length of active duty service.
Servicemen were also eligible to use their benefits while remaining on active
duty, provided they had served a minimum of 181 days. Under this bill, veterans were
also permitted to use their benefits to complete their high school education without any
loss of the basic entitlement.
In 1973, the "Cold War" G.I. Bill provided an allowance of S220 per month to
the veteran without dependents. At the other end of the scale, a veteran with two de-
pendents received an allowance of S298 with an increase of SI 8 for each additional' de-
pendent [Ref. 6: p. 21].
The veteran was required to enroll in a minimum of fourteen semester hours to
receive the full-time benefits. This requirement could be reduced to twelve semester
hours if that was considered the full-time course load by the school. The veteran was
eligible for educational assistance for a maximum period of thirty-six months, with nine
months of additional entitlements available for pursuing a standard undergraduate de-
gree. The limit on the period of eligibility was eight years.
4. Vietnam-Era G.I. Bill
The Vietnam-Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law
93-508) became the newr G.I. Bill for persons who served on active duty between 31
January 1955 and 1 January 1977 [Ref. 2: p. 534]. As in the case of the "Cold War"
G.I. Bill, the veteran must have served on active duty for 180 days or more to be eligible.
Likewise, the veteran must have been discharged under conditions other than dishonor-
able or have been discharged or released from active duty because of a service-related
disability.
Veterans are entitled to benefits at the same rate of one and one-half times the
period on active duty. Monthly allowances are varied according to the type of education
the veteran is receiving (institutional or cooperative) and the time spent in training (full,
three-quarter, half, or one-quarter time).
C. CONTRIBUTORY EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS PROGRAMS
1. Post Vietnam-Era Veterans' Educational Assistance Program (VEAP)
The Veterans' Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976 (Public Law
94-502) established VEAP, which contained several important changes to the previously
existing programs. Previous programs were considered to be more or less universal in
their applications; VEAP required that the service member contribute to his or her
entitlement. The Department of Defense (DoD) matches the members' contribution at
a two-to-one dollar ratio. The maximum total contribution by a service member is
S2,700. With matching funds, the maximum benefit available to the member is S8,100
(or S2,700 from the individual plus S5.400 from the government).
Veterans' educational benefits under this program served several purposes. One
purpose was to promote and assist the newly- established All-Volunteer Force by at-
tracting qualified men and women to serve in the military. Another purpose was, again,
to assist service members and veterans in obtaining education they may not otherwise
be able to afford [Ref. 2: p. 535]. A third purpose was to provide an educational assist-
ance program that would help assure an effective military force while reducing future
expenditures through the G.I. Bill [Ref. 4].
The veteran or member became entitled under the program if he or she entered
military service on or after 1 January 1977 and became a contributor to the program
[Ref. 2: p. 535]. Initially, the contributions could be made by payroll deduction on a
monthly basis at a rate that varied from S50 to S75. The payment schedule was changed
by Congress in fiscal 1981. Members were allowed to make a lump-sum payment or
make monthly contributions of between S25 and SI 00. The aggregate contribution by
the member remained limited to S2,700 [Ref. 7: p. 18].
Benefits accrue at a rate of one-to-one-one month of assistance for each month
of contributions. The maximum benefit available is to be disbursed over thirty-six
months. For the member who had contributed the maximum of S2.700 in a thirty-six
month period, this provides a monthly benefit of S225 for three years.
2. The Department of Defense Educational Assistance Test Program of 1981
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981 established an Educa-
tional Assistance Test Program. The purpose of the program was to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of educational benefits as enlistment incentives for youths. This program was
created partly in response to the growing concern within Congress in attracting and re-
cruiting "quality youths" for the military [Ref. 2: pp. 536-537]. The test program con-
sisted of three different plans: the Tuition Stipend Plan, the Loan Replacement Plan, and
the Noncontributory VEAP Program [Ref. 2: p. 536-537].
The test program also resulted from disappointment with the performance of
VEAP. This disappointment generally centered on the following three aspects [Ref. 7:
pp. 14-17]:
• a lower-than-expected participation rate (participation rates were unevenly distrib-
uted among the Services);
• a considerably higher-than-expected disenrollment rate (about one-third of the
program contributors had disenrolled by the end of fiscal 1981); and
• less-than-expected recruitment rates of higher qualified youth.
The Tuition; Stipend program offered benefits and a living allowance up to a
maximum of SI 5.600. The program was available to members enlisting or reenlisting for
service on active duty after 30 September 1980 and before 1 October 1981. The member
was required to have served at least twenty-four months of his or her service obligation
to become eligible for the entitlement. Also, the member had to have been separated
from the military to receive the benefit. At the first reenlistment following the enlistment
which established eligibility, the member could decide to:
• cash in the benefits at 60 percent of their value; or
• transfer the benefits to a dependent; or
• retain the benefit.
If the benefits were not cashed in, the member could use them or transfer them to a de-
pendent for a period often years following separation from service.
The Loan Repayment Plan authorized DoD to repay Guaranteed Student
Loans or National Direct Student Loans for certain members who were enlisting in the
Ready Reserve or the active service after 30 September 1980 and before 1 October 1981.
To qualify for the benefits, the member must have enlisted in a qualifying occupational
specialty, have successfully completed one year of service, and met criteria as established
by the Secretary of Defense. The loans could be repaid at the greater of a rate of 33.3
percent or SI,500 of the outstanding principal for every year of qualifying service. The
qualifying end date of 1 October 1981 was extended to 1 October 1983 by the Depart-
ment of Defense Authorization Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-86).
The Noncontributory VEAP plan is essentially the same as the modified VEAP
plan except that the government provides 100 percent of the S8,100 benefit. Members
who enlisted between 30 September 1980 and 1 October 1981 and who have elected to
participate in VEAP are eligible for benefits, subject to the selection criteria of the Sec-
retary of Defense.
3. The Army College Fund
The Army College Fund, also known as Ultra-VEAP, is an extension of the
basic VEAP program. The program authorized DoD to make additional contributions
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as the "Secretary deems necessary or appropriate to encourage persons to enter or re-
main in the Armed Forces. . . ." [Ref. 2: p. 535]. The Army College Fund is intended




to act as a special enlistment incentive for the Army;
to increase the quality of Army recruits;
to raise the participation in the basic VEAP program; and
• to improve civilian job prospects for soldiers through enhanced post-service edu-
cation and training.
The Army began experimenting with increased educational benefit bonuses, or
"kickers," in January 1979 in the Multiple Option Recruiting Experiment [Ref. 3]. The
program was available to non-prior service (NPS) enlisted personnel who chose an au-
thorized Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). These MOS were generally of a "crit-
ical" or "hard-to-fill" nature and required a more intensive recruiting effort. The recruit
must have scored in the 50th percentile or above on the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT). (This score equates to an AFQT category IIIA or above.) The recruit also had
to possess a high school diploma.
The results of the experiment on recruiting were inconclusive with respect to the
desirability of a more general program, such as the G.I. Bill, or the cost effectiveness of
any particular program. However, the test showed that the large kickers had a signif-
icant impact on recruiting [Ref. 8]. This, together with the extreme difficulty of Army
recruiting in fiscal 1981, led to the establishment, nationwide, of the Army College Fund
in 1982 [Ref. 3].
The original Army College Fund provided an increased benefit of SI 5,000 for
the recruit who enlisted for a two-year tour. The maximum additional benefit of S20,000
was available for certain recruits enlisting for a four-year term. These benefits are in
addition to the S8,100 available to all recruits under the VEAP program.
The Army College Fund recruit was required to possess a high school diploma
and have scored at or above the 50th percentile on the AFQT. The recruit must also
have enlisted in a critical or hard-to-fill MOS and must contribute S2,700 to the VEAP
program.
Several recent legislative changes have affected the Army College Fund. The
most notable of these changes are those brought about by the enactment of the
Montgomery G.I. Bill, which is discussed in the next section. The Army College Fund
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is still used as a means of attracting high-quality youths to enlist in the Army's hard-
to-fill and critical occupational specialties.
4. The Montgomery G.I. Bill
The Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 1984 was enacted as Title VII of
the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985 (Public Law 98-525), and was
approved on 19 October 1984. Title VII establishes a DoD-VA All-Volunteer Force
Educational Assistance Program for active duty and reserve personnel and veterans. A
DoD Education Benefits Fund was established to be administered by the Treasury De-
partment [Ref. 9].
The stated purposes of the All-Volunteer Force Educational Assistance Pro-
gram are as follows [Ref. 2: p. 537]:
• to provide a new educational assistance program to assist in the readjustment of
members of the Armed Forces to civilian life after their separation from military
service;
• to promote and assist the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Concept of the
Armed Forces by establishing a new program of educational assistance based upon
service on active duty or a combination of service on active duty and in the Selected
Reserve (including the National Guard) to aid in the recruitment and retention of
highly qualified personnel for both the active and reserve components of the Armed
Forces; and
• to give special emphasis to providing educational assistance benefits to aid in the
retention of personnel in the Armed Forces.
The Montgomery G.I. Bill applies to all enlistees who first enter active duty on
or after 1 July 19S5. Unlike the VEAP program, where the enlistee had to elect to par-
ticipate in the program to qualify for benefits, the new G.I. Bill requires that enlistees
must specifically elect not to participate in the program [Ref. 2: p. 538]. The monetary
cost to the individual is SI,200, which is non-refundable. This is a decrease from the
S2,700 contribution required of the VEAP program. A recruit participating in the
Montgomery G.I. Bill is not eligible to participate in the VEAP program.
The Montgomery G.I. Bill provides a total basic benefit of S10,800, which re-
presents a government contribution of S9,600 per individual, an increase from the S5,400
contribution of the VEAP program. The educational benefit is disbursed at the rate of
S300 a month for service members or veterans who serve on active duty for three years.
The benefits are disbursed at a rate of S250 per month for active duty service of two
years. The benefits are payable over a maximum period of thirty-six months.
The Secretary of Defense is authorized under this Act to increase the basic
monthly benefit by S400 to recruit individuals into critical or hard-to-fill occupational
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specialities. A supplemental monthly benefit of S300 is available to members who
complete the initial obligated service required for the basic benefit and who reenlist in
the service. The member may reenlist in the service on either active duty for a period
of five years or on active duty for two years and in the Selected Reserve for four years.
The supplemental benefits may be increased up to an additional S300 on a "targeted
basis" [Ref. 2: p. 538].
5. The Navy Sea College Program
The Navy Sea College Program (SCP) was developed in 1986 and was modeled
on the Army College Fund. In a posture statement to the House Armed Services
Committee, then Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., stated [Ref. 10]:
The newly begun Sea College Program will target the high-quality youth market for
active naval service to broaden the quality base of enlisted personnel, attract high-
quality recruits for non-technical ratings and provide a stable input of fleet experi-
ence general detail non-rated personnel (GENDETS) to the Ready Reserve.
Recruiting for the Sea College Program began on 1 April 1986 [Ref. II ]. The
recruits were enlisted into the Delayed Entry Pool (or DEP) for entry to active service
beginning 1 October 1987. The program was authorized to allow participation by 3.000
new recruits for fiscal 1987. Recruiting into the Sea College Program ended on 4 De-
cember 1987 [Ref. 12]. Those Sea College recruits who had enlisted into the DEP and
were scheduled to enter active service after 31 December 1987 were eventually author-
ized to enter active duty under the terms of their original enlistment contract, which in-
cluded participation in the SCP [Ref. 13].
In program guidance provided to the Navy Recruiting Command, the
Commander stated that the primary purpose of the program was to target high-quality
youth for active naval service [Ref. 14]. Specifically, the Commander noted the following
objectives:
• To broaden the quality base of enlisted personnel.
• To provide increased input of fleet experienced seamen, airmen, and firemen into
the Naval Reserves.
The memorandum also saw the Sea College Program as an opportunity to gain
entry into high-quality high schools, which had been previously resistant to recruiting
by the Navy. Another possible benefit of the program was its possible appeal to mi-
nority applicants who had bypassed Navy recruiters to talk with the Army, supposedly
lured bv the Armv Collece Fund.
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The program derived its authority from the Montgomery G.I. Bill which per-
mitted the Secretary of Defense to increase the amount of the basic educational benefit
for individuals in a critical or hard-to-fill specialty. The application of the program to
GEXDETS (or GEXeral DETail personnel, including seamen, airmen, and firemen) was
justified because GEXDETS had been a hard-to-fill rating since 1983 [Ref. 15].
GEXDETS were also considered to possess skills which were critical to at-sea oper-
ations. The fact that the recruit who enlisted under the program did not receive techni-
cal or class "A" schooling, did not detract from the critical nature of the skills he or she
possessed.
The program was available to both men and women in the same ratio as the
Xavy's Male/Female Accession Plan. The recruit was required to have earned a high
school diploma and score in AFQT category I or II. This represented a marked differ-
ence from the Army College Fund requirement of a score in AFQT category 1 1 1A or
higher (the upper 50th percentile). The recruit must also have enlisted in the military for
the first time and be between the ages of 17 to 22 years [Ref. 14].
The recruit was required to have enlisted for a period of eight years in the
Seaman, Fireman, or Airman Apprentice ratings, as dictated by the needs of the Navy.
The enlistment commitment consisted of two years on continuous active duty, four years
in the Selected Reserve, and two years in the Individual Ready Reserve. The Sea College
Program entitlement is contingent upon satisfactory completion of the annual active
duty for training (ACDUTRA) requirement. Failure to fulfill this requirement will result
in the recall of the member to active duty for up to forty-five days.
The recruit would attend basic training for eight weeks and then apprenticeship
training for four weeks. Enlistees would not attend class "A" schools, but, would be
assigned to a ship or squadron as apprentices. At this point, the enlistee was to receive
on-the-job training (OJT) to acquire the necessary skills that would relieve the shortage
at the specific command.
The recruit is required to participate in the Montgomery G.I. Bill by contrib-
uting the non-refundable SI, 200 within the first twelve months of enlisting. The benefits
accrue at a rate of S522 per month-S300 per month in basic benefits and S222 in kickers
[Ref. 16: p. 4-IV-2]. The member who is eligible for the maximum benefit of approxi-
mately SI 8,800 would begin collecting benefits upon completion of two years of contin-
uous active duty. The member will qualify for the maximum benefits if he or she meets
the following requirements:
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• completes two years of continuous active duty followed by four years duty in the
Selected Reserves; and
• reenlists or extends and remains on continuous active duty for at least forty-eight
months from the initial enlistment date.
The enlistee will become ineligible for benefits under the Sea College Program
if he or she receives an Entry Level Separation (ELS). The ELS is a separation awarded
to a member who has less than 180 days of service. The enlistee will also become ineli-
gible under this program if he or she receives a discharge that is other than honorable
following two years of continuous active duty and four years of duty in the Selected




A significant number of studies have been published regarding the impact of educa-
tional test programs, as well as the impact of educational expectations of young men,
on enlistment decisions. However, research in this area should by no means be consid-
ered exhaustive. In the case of the Navy's Sea College Program, the author has been
unable to find a published work dealing with this particular educational benefit plan.
The factors that affect military labor supply can be categorized into the following
major groups [Ref. 17 : p. 159]:
• the tangible, or measurable, aspects of military service such as direct compensation,
value of benefits, etc.;
• the dissemination of recruiting and enlistment information to the market;
• the conditions of the civilian economy;
• the population base encountered by military recruiters; and
• the individual's preference for military service.
Cooper states that, while military pay is a significant factor of the tangible aspects
of military enlistments, other factors are also important. Such factors as length of
enlistment, choice of military occupation, and the amount of enlistment bonus will also
influence the labor supply. The offer of educational benefits as an inducement to enlist
could be included in this category. The elements of enlistment tangible aspects are dis-
cussed in the sections dealing with educational benefits, educational expectations, and
economic factors.
According to Cooper, a second category influencing the enlistment propensity of an
individual is the dissemination of recruiting and enlistment information and policies.
This category not only includes the effect of the number of production recruiters as-
signed to the field, but it also encompasses the effects of media advertising on a national,
regional, and local basis, as well as direct mailings and canvassing. The purpose of the
recruiting activity may not be specifically to recruit, but rather to inform. The elements
concerning the dissemination of recruiting and enlistment information to the market are
discussed in the section dealing with advertising and the military market.
A third category that influences enlistment supply is the market conditions in the
civilian sector that the prospective recruit must face. These factors are generally beyond
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the control of military manpower planners, and include unemployment rates, civilian
wage rates, and federal and state employment programs. These economic factors are
discussed in the section dealing with determinants of enlistment.
A fourth category discussed by Cooper is the population base from which the mili-
tary must obtain contracts. Given an increasingly smaller population base, the number
of enlistments would be expected to decrease. Studies that have attempted to estimate
the enlistment population supply base are presented.
A final category that influences enlistment supply, according to Cooper, is the per-
sonal "taste" of an individual for military service. This personal taste includes such in-
fluences as job content and satisfaction with working conditions. For the purposes of
this research, taste is discussed only as it applies to the educational expectations of
vouth.
B. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
This chapter reviews literature related to the subject of this research. The review is
divided into six sections, because each section describes a factor of the enlistment supply
environment. In amplification of the five broad categories mentioned by Cooper, an
additional section is presented dealing with the issue of manpower "quality." The re-
maining sections of this chapter are:
• The Issue of Quality.
• Estimating Enlistment Supply Population Base.
• Educational Expectations of Potential Recruits.
• The Effects of Educational Benefits on Enlistments.
• Other Determinants of Enlistments.
• Advertising and the Military Market.
C. THE ISSUE OF QUALITY
The continued enlistment of high-quality youths, (high school diploma graduates
who have scored above the 50th percentile on the AFQT), has been the goal of military
manpower planners as well as Congress. When considering the Veteran's Education and
Employment Assistance Act, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs observed that
terminating the G.I. Bill without a suitable alternative would impair the Services' ability
to attract military recruits. This concern for quality was partially responsible for the
creation of Educational Assistance Test Program, included in the DoD Authorization
Act of 1981 [Ref. 2: p. 536].
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According to Cooper [Ref. 17: pp. 128-136], the quality of a recruit is not readily
measured nor precisely defined. However, quality has been interpreted in terms of
AFQT category and educational achievement. The use of the AFQT percentile score
as a measure of quality is confirmed by Eitelberg et al. in a report that states that the
AFQT was designed as a screening device [Ref. 18: p. 16]. Educational achievement is
measured as the earning of a high school diploma as opposed to earning a General Ed-
ucational Development (GED) certificate or not holding a diploma at all. The value of
educational achievement to military manpower planners is in its correlation to the re-
cruit's potential for adaptability to military life. The desire for quality has arisen from
several principal concerns:
• performance on the job;
• trainability for occupational assignment; and
• potential disciplinary or motivational problems.
The AFQT was developed and introduced specifically as a screening device in July
1950 [Ref. 18: pp. 16-18]. The purpose of the AFQT was to measure the
examinee's general mental ability to absorb military training within a reasonable
period of time and provide a uniform measure of the enlistees usefulness to the ser-
vice.
AFQT scores are recorded in percentiles and are arranged according to five catego-
ries. Sometimes, AFQT categories III and IV are further divided into two and three
subcategories, respectively. Persons who score in AFQT category V are ineligible for
military service; and the proportion of new recruits who score in category IV are con-
trolled by Service policy and Congressional restrictions. Table 1 on page 19 provides
the percentile ranges for AFQT categories I through V [Ref. 17: p. 127].
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Table 1. AFQT CATEGORIES ARRANGED BY PERCENTILE
SCORE RANGES
AFQT Category Percentile Score Range
I 93 and greater
II 65 - 92
III A 50 - 64
III B 31 -49
IV A 21 - 30
IV B 16- 20
IV C 10- 15
V 9 or less
Source: Cooper, R.V.L. Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force
The impact of high-quality enlistments has been documented in several studies and
has substantiated the concerns expressed by Cooper in 1977. Thurman [Ref. 5] observed
that the percentages of soldiers who received adverse discharges or who were discharged
from the Army prior to completing their first enlistment term was significantly lower for
individuals possessing a high school diploma than for those not possessing a diploma.
The percentage of soldiers who received either adverse discharges or who were separated
because of attrition was also lower for those in the upper AFQT categories.
The observations made by Thurman are corroborated in a study conducted by
Buddin. Buddin used data from a matched file of the 1979 Survey of Personnel Entering
Active Duty and the Services' Enlisted Master and Loss Files to examine personnel
attrition within the first six months of military service [Ref. 19: p. 1]. The purpose of the
study was to assess how background characteristics, such as prior work experience and
satisfaction with initial military assignment, affect attrition behavior.
Buddin found that high school graduates were half as likely to separate from the
military within the first six months of an enlistment as were non-high school graduates
[Ref. 19: p. 30]. Another finding was that the AFQT score had a statistically significant
but quantitatively small negative effect on attrition rates [Ref. 19: p. 1].
Van Doren conducted thesis research into the issue of supply and demand for high-
quality Navy recruits. He found that the attrition rates for high school diploma gradu-
ates were lower than the rates for non-high school graduates who enlisted in fiscal 1974
[Ref. 20: p. 11].
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There is evidence of a relationship between the quality of recruits and their per-
formance on the job. Van Doren [Ref. 20: p. 12] cites a study by Horowitz and Sherman
of the Center for Naval Analyses which investigated the impact of the quality of sailors
aboard certain surface ship classes. Horowitz and Sherman found that when the quality
of personnel was compared to the material condition of the ship, the relatively higher-
quality personnel were generally considered more valuable on those ships with more
complex equipment.
Marcus and Quester conducted a study that was an initial investigation into the
determinants of individual productivity in the military. They used survey data from the
supervisors of Navy first-term enlisted personnel and tried to explain the factors causing
recruits to learn faster. The factors they found significant were [Ref. 21: p. 3]:
• ability as measured by AFQT score;
• schooling as measured by being a high school graduate;
• job experience or work history; and
• time on job.
A study was conducted by Scribner et al. to analyze tank crew range firing per-
formance to see if a relationship existed between performance and the tank crew mem-
ber's individual characteristics [Ref. 22]. The researchers found that tank crews with
higher AFQT scores performed substantially better than tank crews with lower AFQT
scores. However, the authors were unable to make any firm conclusions regarding the
influence that the level of civilian education had on tank crew performance. [Ref. 22].
While the concerns of job performance, trainability, and motivational; disciplinary
problems will ensure that the demand for high quality recruits will not slacken, there is
another concern that will reinforce this level of demand. That concern is technology.
The Navy of today is more technologically complex and advanced than the Navy of just
ten years ago. There does not seem to be any indication that this trend will change.
As Hitch and Mc Kean state [Ref. 23: pp. 243-244]:
There can be no question regarding the crucial importance of promoting military'
technology in the nuclear era. Any power that lags significantly in military tech-
nology, no matter how large its military budget or how efficiently it allocates re-
sources is likely to be at the mercy of a more progressive enemy. . . . Keeping ahead
in the technological race is not in itself a guarantee of security in these circum-
stances; it remains essential to incorporate the technology in operational hardware
('forces in being') and to deploy them and use them with skill and intelligence. But
no amount of production, skill, and intelligent use can compensate for technological
inferioritv.
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Murray [Ref 24] discussed the impact that the expansion of force structure and
technology have on manpower requirements. He stated that the training base for certain
ratings had increased while the size of the fleet had been shrinking. In other words, the
training requirements of the fleet measured in terms of the length of training, has in-
creased while the size of the fleet has generally decreased since 1945. Table 2 shows the
changes in the training base expressed as manweeks per unit (ship or aircraft squadron)
for various technical ratings.
It can be seen from the table that the requirement for technical training has steadily
increased over the last four decades. This change is particularly notable for the Data
Systems Technician rating. The changes in training base requirements for this group of
technicians have occurred in just the last 20 years.
Table 2. CHANGES IN NAVY TECHNICAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS IN
MANWEEKS PER UNIT, 1950S THROUGH 1980S
Technical Skill Area 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s
Sonar Technician. Surface







810 3,367 4,671 6,534
Aviation Maintenance
Ratings
573 785 1,050 1.140
Submarine Technical
Ratings
1,675 4,300 6,400 16.846
Source: Murray, R.J. Technology and Manpower: Navy Perspective
Murray also presents evidence that technology is helping the Navy economize on
manpower. The recent design of ships has been to increase the capability of the ship
by installing new weapons and; or sensor systems in a larger hull, thus increasing the
ship's displacement. At the same time, the size of the ship's crew has been decreasing.
Table 3 on page 22 shows the extent of this trend for selected ship classes. The trend
is most evident when contrasting guided missile destroyers (DDGs).
Table 3 shows that the Charles F. Adams class DDG, launched in 1959, displaces
3,370 tons and requires a crew of 396 officers and men. This yields a ratio of manpower
per ship ton of about 0.12. On the other hand, the Kidd class DDG, launched in 1979,
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displaces more than twice as much as the Adams class DDG and yet requires 16 percent
fewer crew members. The manpower per ship ton ratio for the Kidd class DDG is about
0.04.
Table 3. CONTRASTS OF CHANGES IN SHIP DISPLACEMENT WITH RE-













Fletcher 1942 2050 249 .12
Spruance 1973 7300 353 .05
Guided Missile Destroyers:
Charles F. Adams 1959 3370 396 .12
Kidd 1979 8140 332 .04
Frigates:
Brooke 1963 2640 325 .12
Perry 1976 3000 200 .07
Cruisers:
Albany 1945 13700 1000 .07
Ticonderoga 1981 8910 349 .04
Aircraft Carriers
Midway 1944 51000 2522 .05
Nimitz (nuclear) 1972 81600 3177 .04
Submarines:
Guppy 1944 1S70 84 .04
Los Angeles (nuclear) 1974 6000 132 .02
Amphibious:
LST-511 1943 1653 115 .07
LST-1179 1969 4500 259 .06
Source: Murray, R.J. Technology and Manpower: Navy Perspective
Murray concluded that technology more than force structure will determine which
navy will be able to dominate potential adversaries. Given the changing and complex
Navy force structure, the demand for high-quality recruits will not be diminished.
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D. ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF THE POPULATION BASE ON
ENLISTMENT SUPPLY
An important determinant in the manpower supply equation is the population base
from which recruiters must obtain contracts. Since about 1980, the population base of
17- to 21 -year-old men has been declining. The pool of male youths is expected to reach
a low in the mid-1990s when it will be at approximately the same level as in 1966 [Ref.
25: p. 82-83]. Figure 1 on page 24 presents a graphical description of the shrinking
population base.
Fernandez attempted to forecast enlisted supply quantities [Ref. 26]. He felt that,
since the U.S. was facing a decline in the size of the population cohorts, it was necessary
for military manpower planners to be able to forecast supply accurately. He developed
models for three conditions of economic growth within two differing environments.
The three cases of economic growth were categorized "high," "moderate," or "low."
High growth was considered to be during a period of decreasing unemployment rates,
while moderate growth was during a period of more modest decreasing unemployment
rates. Low growth occurred when there existed a fairly consistent unemployment rate.
In 1978 there was a decline in the enlistment levels into all of the Services. The two
differing environments, designated case "A" and case "B", were designed to account for
the factor that caused the low enlistment level in 1978. Case "A" represented the envi-
ronment in which the factor that caused the low enlistment level would be reversed.
Case "B" represented the environment in which the factor would not be reversed.
Fernandez's model consisted of four variables: military pay, civilian pay, recruiters,
and the unemployment rate. Military pay was the compensation that the enlistee, who
had less than two years of service, received during his or her first year. Civilian pay was
the seasonally-adjusted average weekly earnings in the total private economy. The
recruiters variable was the total number of production recruiters, or those who were as-
signed monthly quotas, in the field. Finally, the unemployment rate variable reflected
the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rates for 16- to 19- year old males. The estimates
made by Fernandez are provided in Table 4 on page 25 to Table 9 on page 29. The
projections are made by fiscal year and are divided according to AFQT categories.
The tables show that there is a decline in the projected enlistment supply of AFQT
categories I through 1 1 IB recruits. There is a nominal increase in fiscal 1989; however,
the projected supply decreases again in fiscal 1990. The projected supply estimates for
the case "A" environment are higher than those for the case "B" environment under each
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Figure 1. The Decline in the Population of 17- to 21-Year-Old Males from 1960 to
2000
Source: Lockman, R.F. Trends and Issues in U.S. Navy Manpower
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condition of growth. This is because the factor which caused the low enlistment levels
in 1978 was reversed and had no effect in the case "A" environment.
In Tables 4 through 6, Fernandez estimated that the supply ofAFQT category I and
II recruits would decline by about 31 percent in the case "A" environment for a high
economic growth condition. The decline in supply in the same environment, but for a
low economic growth pattern, is about 15 percent. The reason for the smaller decline
in the second instance is that the civilian unemployment rate is assumed to remain fairly
consistent; therefore, military service will be perceived by some youths as a reasonable
alternative to civilian employment. These youths would not have necessarily enlisted if
there was a decrease in the civilian unemployment rate, characterized by the high eco-
nomic growth condition.
Table 4. NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTION FOR CASE A AND
HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH BY AFQT CATEGORY FROM FIS-
CAL 1982 TO FISCAL 1990
Fiscal Year
AFQT Categories





1981 27.676 14.748 13,848 56,272
1982 25.478 13.364 13.234 52.076
1983 22.689 11.665 11.741 46.095
1984 20.968 10.736 10,197 41.901
1985 20, 1 65 10.423 9.576 40,164
198(5 19.638 10.159 9,323 39.120
1987 19.413 10.046 9,222 38,681
1988 19.499 10,092 9,268 38.859
1989 19.522 10.102 9.275 38,910
1990 19,092 9.875 9.061 38.028
Source: Fernandez, R.F. Forecasting Enlisted Supply: Projections for 1979-1990
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Table 5. NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTION FOR CASE A AND
MODERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH BY AFQT CATEGORY FROM
FISCAL 1982 TO FISCAL 1990
Fiscal Year
AFQT Categories
I & II IIIA IIIB I through
IIIB
1981 28,075 14,983 13.845 56,903
1982 27,029 14.294 13.539 54.862
1983 25.6S5 13,531 12,813 52.029
1984 24.064 12631 11.991 48.686
19S5 22.904 11.996 11,181 46.0S1
19S6 22.300 11,723 10.817 44.840
1987 22.042 11.590 10.698 44,330
198S 22.137 11,643 10.749 44.529
1989 22.166 1 1 .656 10.759 44.5S1
1990 21.6SO 11.396 10.515 43.951
Source: Fernandez. R.F. Forecasting Enlisted Supply: Projections for 1979-1990
Table 6. NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTION FOR CASE A AND
LOW ECONOMIC GROWTH BY AFQT CATEGORY FROM FISCAL
1982 TO FISCAL 1990
Fiscal Year
AFQT Categories
I & II IIIA IIIB I through
IIIB
1981 28,323 15.123 13.839 57.285
1982 27.995 14.892 13.714 56.601
19S3 27.398 14.580 13.491 55,469
1984 26.378 14.028 12.992 53,398
1985 25,466 13.544 12.545 51.555
19S6 24,785 13.184 12.213 50.1S2
1987 24.496 13.033 12.076 49.605
19S8 24.601 13,091 12.133 49,825
1989 24.635 13.107 12.146 49,888
1990 24.098 12.817 11.872 48,787
Source: Fernandez, R.F. Forecasting Enlisted Supply: Projections for 1979-1990
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In Tables 7 through 9, Fernandez estimates the supply of AFQT category I and II
recruits will decline from fiscal 1981 to 1990. His estimate of 21,960 AFQT category I
and II recruits in Fiscal 1981 is about 21 percent lower than his estimate of the same
category and fiscal year in the case "A" environment. The lower estimate in the case "B"
environment is due to the effect of the factor which caused the decline in enlistment
levels in 1978. In the case "B" environment this effect is not reversed.
Tables 7 through 9 show that there is a decline in the projected supply of AFQT
category I and II recruits from fiscal 1981 to 1990. The decline is about 34 percent for
the high economic growth condition. The low economic growth condition experiences
a decline of 15 percent.
The rate of projected enlistment supply decline from fiscal 1981 to 1990 is the same
for both cases under a low economic growth condition. However, the projected total
number of AFQT category I and II recruits for fiscal 1981 in case "B" is about 21 per-
cent lower than the comparable estimate in case "A."
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Table 7. NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTION FOR CASE B AND
HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH BY AFQT CATEGORY FROM FIS-
CAL 1982 TO FISCAL 1990
Fiscal Year
AFQT Categories
I &I1 IIIA IIIB I through
IIIB
1981 21,960 14,748 13,848 50,556
1982 20.222 13,364 13.234 46,820
1983 17,799 11.665 11.741 41,205
1984 16,136 10,736 10,197 37.069
1985 15.415 10.423 9,576 35,414
1986 15.012 10,159 9,323 34.494
1987 14,843 10.046 9.222 34.111
1988 14.911 10.092 9.268 34.271
1989 14.926 10,102 9,275 34.303
1990 14.592 9,875 9.061 33.528
Source: Fernandez, R.F. Forecasting Enlisted Supply: Projections for 1979-1990
Table 8. NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTION FOR CASE B AND
MODERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH BY AFQT CATEGORY FROM
FISCAL 1982 TO FISCAL 1990
Fiscal Year
AFQT Categories
I & II IIIA IIIB I through
IIIB
1981 22.250 14.983 13.845 51.078
1982 21.452 14.294 13.539 49.285
1983 20.302 13,531 12.813 46.646
1984 18.953 12,631 11.991 43.575
1985 17,932 11,996 11,181 41,109
1986 17.431 11.723 10.817 39.971
1987 17.233 11.590 10.698 39,521
19SS 17.309 11.643 10,749 39,701
1989 17.329 1 1 ,656 10.759 39.744
1990 16.945 11,396 10,515 38.856
Source: Fernandez, R.F. Forecasting Enlisted Supply: Projections for 1979-1990
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Table 9. NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTION FOR CASE B AND
LOW ECONOMIC GROWTH BY AFQT CATEGORY FROM FISCAL
1982 TO FISCAL 1990
Fiscal Year
AFQT Categories
I & II IIIA IIIB I through
IIIB
1981 22,432 15,123 13.839 51,394
19S2 22.206 14,892 13.714 50,812
1983 21,760 14,580 13,491 49,831
19S4 20,952 14.028 12,992 47,972
1985 20,229 13,544 12.545 46,318
1986 19.690 13,184 12.213 45,087
1987 19.464 13.033 12,076 44.573
198S 19.549 13,091 12.133 44.773
1989 19,573 13.107 12,146 44.826
1990 19.142 12.817 11.872 43.831
Source: Fernandez, R.F. Forecasting Enlisted Supply: Projections for 1979-1990
Goldberg also attempted to determine the quantity of enlisted supply in a study
published in [Ref. 27]. In this study, the enlistment supply of high school graduates was
estimated as a function of the following:
• relative military-to-civilian pay;
• unemployment rate;
• government youth programs;
• male population;
• percentage black population; and
• number of recruiters assigned for each service.
The relative military pay is the pay earned by an enlistee in pay grade E-l with less
than two years of service divided by the annual full time earnings of an 18- year-old ci-
vilian man. The unemployment variable reflected the unemployment rate for all civilians
as opposed to that for the 17- to IS- year old age group. The youth programs variable
was included to account for the effect of the Labor Department Employment and
Training Administration's expenditures for youth programs and counter-cyclical pro-
grams.
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The male population variable reflected the 17- to 21- year old population within the
individual Naval Recruiting District (NRD), and the NRDs percentage of black popu-
lation is reflected in the model as well. VEAP is a dichotomous dummy variable equal
to zero in 1976 and prior years and one in 1977 and later; VEAP was introduced in 1977.
Finally, the effect of the number of recruiters of each service is included as an explana-
tory variable in the model.
Goldberg found that the loss of the G.I. Bill in 1977 caused a large decline in the
enlistment supply. This finding appears to be the cause of the 1978 decline in enlistment
levels encountered by Fernandez in his study and which defined his case "A" and case
"B" environments. Another finding of Goldberg was that a G.I. Bill similar to that of
the World War II or Vietnam eras was more expensive when compared to increased
enlistment bonus levels, increased number of recruiters, and increased advertising ex-
penditures. Table lOprovides forecasts of enlistment supply for high school graduates
for fiscal 1981 through fiscal 1987 by AFQT categories.
Table 10. FORECAST OF ENLISTMENT SUPPLY OF HIGH
SCHOOL GRADUATES (HSG) BY AFQT CATEGORY




I to II I to IIIA
1982 30,500 44.700 78.600
1983 28.700 42.100 73,200
1984 27.500 40.200 69,400
1985 27.100 39.600 68.400
19S6 26,800 39,200 67.600
1987 26.600 38.900 67.100
Source: Goldberg, L. Enlisted Supply: Past, Present, and Future
Goldberg was able to test his model by forecasting high school graduate enlistments
for fiscal 1981 and comparing his results to the actual number of enlistments for the
same period. The model underestimated AFQT category I and II enlistments by 2.1
percent. It also underestimated AFQT categories I through IIIA enlistments by 3.6
percent. The model did overestimate total high school graduate enlistments by 1.4 per-
cent.
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A comparison of the forecasts of the enlisted supply by both Fernandez and
Goldberg provides some interesting results. Table 11 on page 31 presents the accuracy
of the Navy enlistment supply projections ofAFQT category I and II recruits for fiscal
1981. Forecast error is computed using the fiscal 1981 actual Navy enlistment total of
29,100 recruits reported by Goldberg [Ref. 27: p. 53.].
The table shows that the accuracy of the enlistment supply estimated by Fernandez
in the case "A" environment for a condition of low economic growth compares favorably
with the accuracy obtained by Goldberg. The accuracy of the estimates made by
Fernandez decreases as the rate of the economic growth moves higher. The accuracy for
the case "B" model is very poor, exceeding 22 percent.
Table 1 1. ACCURACY OF NAVY ENLISTMENT SUPPLY PROJECTIONS OF
AFQT CATEGORY I AND II RECRUITS FOR FISCAL 1981
Type of Forecast Projected Supply Forecast Error(%)
Fernandez Model
Case "A"
High Growth 27.676 - 4.9
Moderate Growth 28.075 - 3.5
Low Growth 28.323 - 2.7
Fernandez Model
Case "B"
High Growth 21.960 - 24.5
Moderate Growth 22,250 - 23.5
Low Growth 22.432 - 22.9
Goldberg Model 28.500 - 2.1
Sources: Goldberg and Fernandez
E. EDUCATIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF POTENTIAL RECRUITS
The demand for and the expectation of education by an individual can be thought
of as an economic choice. If the individual perceives, if not explicitly, that the invest-
ment expenditures of direct expenses, forgone earnings, and psychic loss are less than the
expected returns of a higher level of earning at some future point, greater job satisfaction
over his or her lifetime, and a greater appreciation of nonmarket activities, then the in-
dividual is more likely to desire and pursue a higher level of education. Psychic loss in
this context refers to a cost that is incurred because education is difficult and tedious.
The benefits derived from increased education must be calculated over time and re-
quire discounting to the present value. The present value (PV) may be expressed math-




PK is the present value of the benefit,
B is the value of the benefit at time t,
r is the discount rate.
The discount rate is a measure of how much the individual weighs future outcomes
or events. If the individual does not weigh future benefits very heavily, he or she is
considered present-oriented. The more present-oriented an individual is, the higher the
discount rate (r) will be. [Ref. 28: p. 296]
The benefits are discounted over a period of time t which, in this case, is considered
to be the length of the working life of an individual. Given a retirement age of 65 years,
an 18- year-old high school graduate would be able to discount a college education over
a greater length of time than a 25- year-old. Therefore, younger people are more inclined
than older people to obtain a college education, other factors being equal [Ref. 28: pp.
297-298].
The decision to invest in a college education can be mathematically expressed as




C is the total cost, both direct and indirect, of a college education,
BT is the yearly difference in earnings between a high school and college
graduate.
The above model allows the following general assumptions to be made concerning
the economic choice of a college education [Ref. 28: pp. 295-296]:
• present-oriented individuals are less likely to attend college than forward looking
individuals, other variables being held equal;
• college students will tend to be young;
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• the demand for college education will increase if the costs to the student decrease;
and
• the demand for college education will increase if the benefits of one increase.
Fredland and Little conducted a study to examine the differences between 18- to 22-
year old servicemen and civilian males of the same cohort with respect to education
levels, aspirations, and expectations [Ref. 29]. The data was obtained from the National
Longitudinal Survey, Youth Cohort, 1979. The study was intended to serve the pur-
poses of:
• providing insight into the quality of service members compared to their civilian
counterparts, and
• assessing the utility of a postservice educational program as a recruiting attraction
by using a measure of educational aspirations and expectations.
Fredland and Little found that the educational aspirations and expectations of per-
sons in the military exceeded that of their civilian counterparts. A summary of their
findings for the white subgroup, expressed as percentages, is provided in Table 12 on
page 34.
Fredland and Little found that among blacks, 22 percent of the military aspired to
obtain a graduate education, beyond four years of college education, compared with 21
percent of the civilian sample. Among Hispanics, 21 percent of those in the military
expressed the desire to complete graduate education while only 18 percent of their civil-
ian counterparts indicated the same. Among whites, 47 percent of military respondents
aspire to complete a four-year college education while only 36 percent of the respondents
expect that they will complete it. This contrasts to 27 percent of the white civilian re-
spondents who aspire to a college education while 23 percent of the respondents expect
they will complete it. It appears that, while more white military respondents aspire to
college education, a greater proportion of their civilian counterparts expect to fulfill their
aspirations.
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Table 12. EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND EXPECTA-













Source: Fredland, J.E. and Little, R.D. Educational Levels, Aspirations,
and Expectations of Males, Ages 18-22
Fredland and Little offered the following conclusions:
• Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics in the military desire, on average, significantly more
years of college education than their civilian counterparts.
• Military members expect to complete more years of education than their civilian
counterparts.
• Educational aspirations and expectations may serve as indicators of quality.
• The services appeared to attract many who desired and expected further education
without the benefit of postservice educational benefits.
Hosek, Peterson, and Eden examined the probability of an individual enlisting as a
function of personal characteristics, family background, employment situation, and ed-
ucational expectations. The study was undertaken because it was felt that the military
would be faced with increased competition for youth labor due to the shrinking labor
pool and a consequent rising civilian wage. The study was intended to assist the Services
in defining segments of the recruiting markets and then design tactics to target those
segments. [Ref. 30: p. v.]
The study by Hosek et al. was distinctive in three ways. First, they analyzed actual
enlistment behavior as opposed to enlistment intentions. Second, the behavior of indi-
viduals was analyzed and not that of aggregated data. Finally, enlistment behavior was
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analyzed in distinct segments of the recruiting market because of a large, specially cre-
ated data base. The recruiting market segments upon which they focused were high
school seniors and high school graduates who were not students.
The findings of the study indicate that graduates are more sensitive to work-related
variables than are high school seniors when determining propensity to enlist. The
work-related variable included wage rate, job tenure, labor force experience, weekly
hours worked, and employment status. Seniors were more responsive to educational
variables such as learning proficiency, ability to finance education, and parental influ-
ence. The study found that the longer a graduate enjoys success in the civilian labor
market, the less likely he is to enlist.
Shavelson, Haggstrom, and Winkler attempted to determine the recruiting potential
of the two year college market. They examined the educational expectations of high
school seniors. They found that seniors who anticipated attending a two-year college
expected to obtain one more year of education than seniors who planned to enter the
military. Additionally, seniors expected one more year of education than what was
available from a two-year degree program (.Ref. 31: p. 65]. The two-year college-bound
senior was more than twice as likely to aspire to a professional career than the senior
who planned on entering the military.
The researchers concluded that enlistment packages should address the educational
expectations and professional aspirations of the two-year college student. The inclusion
of an educational benefit package may address those needs.
Shavelson et al. estimates that the postsecondary education market contains over
one million men. These men meet or exceed enlistment standards and fall within
recruitment age ranges. The authors suggest that by recruiting from this market,
enlistment quality may increase because of the influx of high school graduates with
above average aptitudes [Ref. 31: p. 73].
F. THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ON ENLISTMENTS
An early study attempting to relate enlistment behavior to educational benefits was
conducted by Arima in 1978. This study sought to determine the incentive value of the
Navy Campus for Achievement (NCFA) in attracting volunteers for enlistments. To do
this, a recruiting aids booklet that described the NCFA was developed and made avail-
able to recruiters. Advertising devoted exclusively to the NCFA was also developed and
distributed through two national weekly magazines [Ref. 32: p. ii].
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The effectiveness of the recruiter's booklet was measured by the number of issues
ordered by the recruiter. Arima compared the monthly demand for the booklet with the
number of contracts signed per month, which he estimated at 10,000. This yielded a
ratio of approximately four to five booklets distributed for each contract. According to
Arima, this was an indication of its value as a "sale" tool. [Ref. 32: p. 19]
The effectiveness of media advertising was measured by the number of inquiries and
eligible leads that were received at the Navy Opportunities Center. The NCFA ad drew
nearly 20 percent more total inquiries than the average of the leads generated for the
other four concurrent enlistment programs [Ref. 32: p. 21].
Based on the demand for the NCFA booklet and the response to media advertising,
Arima states that the "concept of the NCFA has very great incentive value for the re-
cruiting effort of the Navy" [Ref. 32: p. 23]. Arima concluded the study by recom-
mending that the NCFA should emphasize the college education opportunities available
in the Navy, as well as the opportunities for learning technical skills [Ref. 32: pp. 26-27].
An extensive study was conducted by the Rand Corporation from December 1980
to September 1981 to determine the enlistment effects of four different educational ben-
efit programs. There were several policy issues that had to be considered in the test.
These issues were [Ref. 33 : pp. 2-3]:
• Would the educational benefits attract high quality recruits?
• Should the educational benefits be available to all enlistees or be targeted toward
particular subgroups, such as enlistees in hard to fill or critical occupational skills?
• What are the effects of special features, such as education loan repayment?
• Would the educational benefits have an adverse effect on retention?
The programs were offered in balanced sets of geographic areas nationwide. In ad-
dition to a control program, three new educational benefit plans were designed by DoD
and Congress. The plans were [Ref. 33: pp. 5-6]:
• Control: this plan provided the Basic VEAP in which all personnel from each of the
Services was eligible to participate. Additionally, the Army offered up to a S6.000
enlistment bonus to high quality personnel in critical skill occupations.
• Ultra-VEAP: this plan provided the Basic VEAP with a kicker of S8,000 for a
two-year enlistment or SI 2,000 for a three- or four-year enlistment in the Army.
The other Services offered just the Basic VEAP.
• Noncontributory VEAP: this plan provided the Basic VEAP plus up to S6,000
kicker for qualified Army enlistees without requiring payments from the individ-
uals.
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• Tuition Stipend: this plan provided a more generous noncontributory plan offering
up to SI 5,600 in benefits and indexed for inflation. This plan was universally of-
fered by all the Services and did not include kickers.
Table 13 compares the four programs by service and by percentage of geographic
availability nationwide. Amounts are in dollars and are net of the individual's contrib-
ution. The table shows that the control program was offered in more than half the na-
tion. The Ultra-VEAP program, which had the greatest dollar benefit value to an Army
recruit, was offered in 18 percent of the nation. The Tuition/Stipend program which
offered the greatest dollar benefit value to recruits of the other Services, was offered in
only 15 percent of the nation.
Table 13. MAXIMUM DOLLAR BENEFIT VALUE OF EACH OF THE TEST












Control 1 1 .400 5.400 52 %
Ultra-VEAP 17.400 5.400 18 %
Noncontributorv
VEAP 14,100 8,100 15 %
Tuition Stipend 15.600 15.600 15 %
Source: Fernandez, R.L. Enlistment Effects and Policy Implications of the Educational
Test Program
The Basic VEAP was open to all enlistees. However, to be eligible for kickers and
the noncontributory test plans, enlistees had to meet certain eligibility requirements.
For example, recruits had to possess a high school diploma and score in the upper 50th
percentile of the AFQT. Additionally, the recruit had to enter one of a number of crit-
ical occupational skills as determined by the service [Ref. 33: p. 11].
The results of the test indicated that the noncontributory plans had a positive effect
on enlistments in the Air Force and Navy. When compared to the control program, the
noncontributory VEAP increased enlistments by 3.6 percent in the Air Force and 3.4
percent in the Navy; however, neither result was statistically significant. On the other
hand, the Tuition/Stipend program was statistically significant and increased enlistments
by 5.6 percent in the Air Force and 8.2 percent in the Navy [Ref. 33: pp. 14-16].
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The impact of the tests on Army enlistments was even more impressive. The
Ultra-VEAP program increased enlistments by 8.7 percent when compared to
enlistments generated by the control program and the increase was statistically signif-
icant. The noncontributory VEAP performed essentially the same as the control plan
and had a negligible effect on enlistments [Ref. 33: p. 17].
The Tuition Stipend plan apparently reduced Army enlistments by approximately 6
percent when compared with the control plan [Ref. 33: p. 18]. The explanation for this
decrease may lie in the differences of the net maximum benefit value of the four pro-
grams. In all the programs except one, the Army enjoyed a benefit value advantage of
at least 43 percent. In the Tuition/Stipend plan, the benefit value is equal among all the
Services. The authors concluded that if the Army were not able to offer greater benefits
than the other Services, then high-quality enlistments would be reduced [Ref. 33: p. 19].
The study also concluded that educational benefit plans were successful in channel-
ing recruits into those occupational groups which had been targeted. However, the re-
sults suggested that if program eligibility were to be opened to enlistees in other than
critical occupational ratings, then enlistments into the critical ratings would decrease
[Ref. 33: p. 33].
A second Rand study of this test affirmed the findings of the earlier research.
Fernandez found that Army enlistments could be reduced if a benefit differential was not
maintained. He also found that educational benefits may be less effective in attracting
recruits into the Army than into the other Services. Fernandez also affirmed the skill
channeling effects in the Army. He concluded that enlistments in eligible specialties
under the Ultra-Veap rose sufficiently to absorb all of the total enlistment gain attrib-
utable to the program. [Ref. 34]
Lockman also indicated the importance of educational benefit programs to increased
enlistment levels. In an effort to explain the underlying reasons for the Army's success
in recruiting high quality enlistees, he identified the following [Ref. 35]:
• the Army College Fund: Ultra-VEAP kickers of up to a maximum of SI 2,000 plus
an enlistment bonus maximum of S8,000;
• Labor Department Employment and Training Administration program budget
cuts; and
• an increase of 13 percent in the number ofArmy recruiters in two years.
G. OTHER DETERMINANTS OF ENLISTMENTS
The need for developing a more accurate means of estimating enlistment supply has
increased with time. According to Morey and Mc Cann, this need becomes particularly
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important in light of a shrinking population base and an expanding economy. The im-
portance of accurate supply estimation is emphasized to an even greater degree when
one considers the impact that an annual recruiting budget of SI billion or more can have
on DoD manpower costs. Morey and Mc Cann also maintain that enlistment supply
estimation not only affects manpower budgets but also weapons system design and au-
thorized manning levels. [Ref. 36]
The authors reviewed twenty studies that were conducted between 1975 and 1980.
The studies used the all-volunteer experience as the basis for their findings, which are
often divergent. The authors were able to distill thirteen factors which they considered
to be important to the estimation of enlistment supply.
The authors state that the preferred dependent variable is enlistment contracts as
opposed to accessions and the ideal dependent variable is high-quality contracts. Ac-
cessions are not the preferred dependent variable because the time-sensitive variables,
such as unemployment, advertising, pay, etc., have less of an affect unless they are suf-
ficiently lagged. The important explanatory variables identified by Morey and Mc Cann
are:
unemployment rate;










federal and state minimum wages; and
length of first term contracts.
The independent variables of military pay, unemployment, and recruiters were found
to have a significant effect on total enlistment supply in a study done by Goldberg and
Greenston [Ref. 37]. The authors found that the loss of the G.I. Bill in 1977 caused a
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large reduction in overall enlistments. Goldberg and Greenston also found that the
percentage of an area's black population was negatively correlated with enlistments.
Dale and Gilroy analyzed primarily macroeconomic factors of enlistment in a 1984
study [Ref. 38]. The purpose of the research was to specify a more robust model of
Army enlistments as a function of pay, unemployment, and other exogenous variables
such as educational benefits and advertising expenditures. Using time series data, the
model utilized the current teenage unemployment rate as well as the unemployment rate
lagged for two and four months.
The authors arrived at the following conclusions as a result of the study:
• a rise in the unemployment rate led to a substantial increase in Army enlistments;
• a military wage freeze resulting in an increase in the military-to-civilian wage ratio
would cause a substantial decrease in the enlistment rate;
• educational benefits are important to high school graduate enlistees; and
• noneconomic factors such as recruiter-to-population ratio have a significant impact
on enlistments.
H. ADVERTISING AND THE MILITARY MARKET
According to Martin [Ref. 39]. the change to all-volunteer recruiting was a move
from draft dependence to market dependence. This caused DoD to assume a role of a
marketer to the youth of the nation. This change also made the military an instrument
in a large scale test of the application of marketing theory and practice to a national
public policy issue.
Martin contends that recruiting advertisement is the most criticized and least un-
derstood aspect of military manpower procurement. This is because it is very difficult
to establish quantitatively the impact that advertising has on recruitment. This frus-
tration is worsened when the impact of advertising must be measured in terms of ge-
ography (national, regional, and local audiences); media (television, radio, periodicals,
newspapers, and direct mailings); or targeted audiences (black, Hispanic, or college
bound).
Martin presents several issues that might be encountered by the Navy (or any gov-
ernment marketer) when applying marketing theory and practice to recruiting:
• Marketing, or "selling," may be perceived negatively by the public. The govern-
ment has a special responsibility to ensure that marketing approaches are above
reproach.
• Programming and budgeting are very difficult aspects of advertising. The question
"How much is enough?" is hard to answer confidently.
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• The taxpayer deserves the same quality marketing management as do the share-
holders of any major private sector firm.
• Product changes are difficult to accomplish for government marketers, especially
given governmental managerial processes.
• Government marketers have difficulty adapting to a dynamic market.
• The feasibility of a marketing theory and practice approach for recruiting sufficient
numbers of youth, particularly in light of a shrinking population base, may be
questionable.
Goldberg [Ref. 40] conducted a study to analyze the effects that recruiters and ad-
vertising have on the enlistment of high school graduates in the Navy. In response to
recruiting shortfalls during fiscal years 1978 and 1979, several options were being con-
sidered to raise the number of high-quality recruits. Goldberg hypothesized that in-
creasing the resources allocated to recruiters and advertising may be a less expensive
means of generating enlistments than raising pay or pay bonuses.
It is difficult to measure the effect of advertising on enlistments. Goldberg states
that advertising increases the demand for a product at the time of the expenditure and
in the future. However, the effect of advertising also decays over time. Therefore, the
impact of advertising must be thought of in its immediate and cumulative effect com-
ponents as well as with an estimate of its rate of decay or depreciation rate.
Goldberg treats Navy advertising as an investment in a stock of "awareness capital."
He assumes that a current expenditure of S250 generates one unit of awareness capital
in the following quarter. The net capital stock depends on the base period stock of
awareness capital (A' ), the depreciation rate per quarter (<5), and the stream of advertis-












Goldberg estimated high school graduate enlistments using maximum likelihood es-
timation since he did not know the depreciation rate per quarter. He included both
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X,{5) and Y,(S) as explanatory variables, along with other factors when modeling high
school graduate enlistments. The regression coefficient of Y
t
(S) is the measurement of
the effect that a one unit of change in awareness capital stock has on enlistments. The
regression coefficient of X,{S) is equal to the product of K and the coefficient of Y,(S) .
Goldberg tested his model using 1978 data and the model predicted sharp declines
in enlistments with a 2. 1 percent error for the year. The effect of an advertising budget
increase of SI million was an increase of 1,206 high school graduate enlistments. Of this
amount, only 37 percent would be in AFQT categories I through IIIA. Therefore,
Goldberg concluded that most advertising effects are realized by recruits in the lower
AFQT categories. Additionally, based on an estimated depreciation rate of 11 percent
per quarter, the effects of advertising were felt mostly in the future.
Hanssens and Levien [Ref 41] conducted a study that attempted to investigate the
effectiveness of aggressive marketing strategies undertaken by the Navy to attract a
sufficient number of qualified enlistments. The emphasis of their study was on the ef-
fects of advertising and personal selling.
The Navy's marketing efforts consisted of recruiters, recruiting aids, and media ad-
vertising expenditures. The advertising expenditures consisted of television, radio, direct
mail, outdoor media (billboards, buses, etc.,), and magazines 'newspapers. All of the ef-
forts were expected to positively influence enlistments with the possible exception of lo-
cal advertising. The research also examined the effect of market-specific phenomena
such as advertising wearout, word-of-mouth, and components of personal selling effort.
The authors identified a unique characteristic of the recruiting market. They ob-
served that the product, enlistment, can be purchased only once; therefore, the market
is subject to continuous depletion and rejuvenation. Youth cohorts enter the market at
age 17 and exit the market either by enlisting or aging. Market depletion is important,
according to Hanssens and Levien, because it relates to the concept of advertising
wearout. As an advertising campaign is initiated, the response in the form of enlistments
is immediate, but levels off over time. Two reasons are offered for this. First, given that
some youths are more likely to enlist than others, individuals then respond to advertising
by enlisting, and the size of the target market shrinks. The second reason is that the
remaining prospects are less likely to enlist and that continued advertising will have little
effect on this group.
The authors expected advertising wearout to occur in the television, radio, printed,
and outdoor media. Wearout mav occur but is not measurable. The authors do not
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expect wearout in direct mail advertising because of the selective exposure of this cate-
gory-.
The second market phenomena investigated by the study is that of word-of-mouth.
The authors make the assumption that in the youth market, where the new recruits are
highly interactive with potential recruits, it is reasonable to expect that recent enlistees
may influence their peers to enlist. This effect is measured by the monthly per-capita
size of the Delayed Entry Program (or DEP) pool.
The third phenomena is that of personal selling. The authors attempt to measure
this effort based on the number of recruiters and monthly accession goals. The monthly
accession goals are hypothesized to provide a measure of the motivation of the recruiter.
The effort of personal selling is also measured by the expenditures on recruiting aids.
The authors used a log-linear multivariate base model because of its reported ad-
vantage in sales response research. The measures of recruiting performance that were
estimated are:
• enlistment leads;
• DEP contracts; and
• direct ship contracts.
The results with respect to advertising indicated that national enlistment leads are
significant only for the DEP contracts and have an elasticity of about 0.11. This may
be an indication that most contracts were the result of a locally generated lead.
The enlistment lead equation had elasticities of 0.44 for mass media advertising and
0.11 for direct mail. Local advertising had an elasticity of— 0.06 and word-of-mouth
had an elasticity of 0.18. The word-of-mouth elasticity may indicated that a positive
influence was exerted by DEP recruits on potential enlistees.
The percentage of high school seniors in the target population had an elasticity of
0.90 in the direct shipment contracts equation. The motivational factor of accession
goals had an elasticity of about 0.65; and the elasticity for recruiters was 0.24.
The authors concluded that advertising has most of its effect in generating leads
rather than contracts. In other words, advertising is more effective in generating interest
rather than making a sale.
I. SUMMARY
In summary, the purpose of this review has been to examine the factors that influ-
ence the decision of a young man or woman to enlist in the military. The decision is
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influenced by economic, demographic, and societal concerns. The development and
application of an educational benefits program should be able to influence each area of
concern.
The educational benefits program that is offered to potential enlistees should be
designed to attract high-quality recruits to ensure that a supply of requisite quality and
numbers is available to the Navy. The prospective recruit must perceive the program
as having a positive economic benefit greater than his or her other alternatives. The
program should be targeted towards groups that have indicated a desire for education
beyond the secondary7 level. Finally, since the program is targeted to a select audience,
the program should be marketed in the most cost-effective manner.
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IV. DATA BASE, METHODOLOGY, AND FINDINGS OF THE
FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
Navy Recruiting Command provided two data bases that were used in this research:
PRIDE and the Enlistment Market Analysis. The PRIDE data base is the Personalized
Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Enlistment System. This was used to make fre-
quency comparisons between enlistment programs and is discussed in greater detail be-
low.
PRIDE provides the Navy with an orderly and efficient mechanism for management
and control of the recruiting process [Ref. 42: pp. 1.1-1.2]. The Pride System performs
the following functions:
• evaluates the qualifications of each accession against the qualifications required by
each enlistment program. This prevents the individual from enlisting into a pro-
gram for which he or she may not be qualified for;
• assigns new accessions to "A" school training quotas, thus allocating training re-
sources; and
• identifies the occupational ratings for which the individual is best suited.
B. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
This chapter describes the construction of the sample data file, the determinants
used in selecting comparisons, the construction and modification of variables, the
methodology employed and the findings of the frequency analysis.
C. DATA FILE CONSTRUCTION
The sample data file was constructed by obtaining a random sample of the PRIDE
data base. The PRIDE data base contained 430,825 records of individual accessions into
the Navy from fiscal 1983 to fiscal 1989 (except for fiscal 1985 for which there were no
records available). The data base was sorted by date of enlistment, and then a sample
of 30,000 records was selected randomly using direct access sampling with replacement.
This sample was used in all steps of the analysis.
The sample provided individual information on the accessions. This information
included, but was not limited, to:
• AFQT percentile scores,
• ASVAB subtest scores,
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• Enlistment programs,
• Date of Enlistment and Ship date,
• Birth date,
• Gender,
• Level of education,
• Race and Ethnic background, and
,
• Enlisted rate.
Records were removed from the data base that would be of limited interest or that
would be a potential source of errors. The criteria used and justification were:
• if the individual's AFQT percentile score was recorded as being less then ten, then
the record was deleted. An AFQT percentile score of less than ten places the in-
dividual in AFQT category V, (ineligible for enlistment).
• if the individual's AFQT percentile score was recorded as being greater than 99,
then the record was deleted. A percentile score of 100 was of little value and was
considered to be a coding error.
• if the individual was a woman, then the record was dropped from consideration.
This is because of the comparatively low proportion (2.4 percent) of women per-
mitted to enlist under the SCP [Ref. 1 1].
• if the individual had a birth date prior to 1 January 1961, then the record was de-
leted. Individuals born before this date would have been too old to enlist under the
SCP when it was implemented. This step also removed those records where the
birthdate may have been improperly coded.
• only those records that had a recorded enlistment date of between 1 October 1982
(the start of fiscal 1983) and 30 September 1989 (the end of fiscal 1989) were ana-
lyzed.
This procedure reduced the size of the sample database by 25.6 percent. The final
number of observations in the sample was 22,309, or 5.18 percent of the original data
base. See Table 14 on page 47 for the number of observations that were deleted for each
criterion used.
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Less AFQT Category V 2,733
Less AFQT Percentile Score Greater Than 99 1
Less Females 3,070
Less Individuals Born Prior to 1 January 1961 1.134
Less Enlistments Prior to 1 October 1982
Less Enlistments After 30 September 1989 753
D. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION
The variable RACE was condensed from six categories to three. The three categories
are:
• White: all recruits who were coded as being Caucasian;
• Black: all recruits who were coded as being black;
• Other: all recruits who were coded as being Asian, American Indian, other or un-
known.
There were three variables created for the analysis. These variables were ETHNIC,
AFQTMG, and DODOCC. Details of their construction are presented below.
1. ETHNIC
The original data base used 22 codes to describe the ethnicity of accessions.
This number of ethnic groups was not practical for analysis because of the small cell
frequencies of some of the groups. Greater than 89 percent of the accessions had their
ethnic background described as "other," "unknown," or "none," with the remainder dis-
tributed over the other groups. Therefore, the ethnic group was collapsed into eight
categories, shown below:





• Hispanic: included all accessions who had been coded as being of Spanish descent,
Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, Cuban-American, or Latin American
(Hispanic);
• Indian;
• Island: included all who had been coded as being Melanesian, Micronesian,
Polynesian, or of other Pacific Island heritage;
• Native American: included American Indian, Aleut, and Eskimo; and
• Other: category included all accessions who had not been coded as being part of
any other category.
2. AFQTMG
The AFQT percentile scores were divided into AFQT categories I through IV.
This permitted analysis of an enlistment program by AFQT category. The cutofT used
in assigning an accession to an AFQT category is provided in Table 15.
Table 15. ASSIGNMENT OF AFQT CATEGORY BY AFQT
PERCENTILE SCORE
If AFQT Percentile Score was Then AFQT Category
was
93 or greater I
From 65 To 92 II
From 50 To 64 IIIA
From 31 To 49 IIIB
From 10 To 30 IV
Source: Cooper, R.V.L. Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force
3. DODOCC
This variable is the DoD occupational code and it is a discrete variable ranging
from zero to nine. This code converts all Navy ratings to a DoD occupational standard.
Table 16 on page 49 provides the discrete DODOCC occupational code and its title.
DoD Occupational Area Code nine consists of service memberswho are medical facility
patients, prisoners, officer candidates, etc., and are not considered in the frequency
analysis. Appendix A provides the DoD occupational code and the Navy ratings that
comprise that code.
One alteration has been made. The DoD occupational conversion manual re-
quires that the Fireman (FN) rating be included as part of the DoD occupational group
one, Electronic Equipment Repairers. When the other Navy ratings which also comprise
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this group are surveyed, it can be seen that there is a dissimilarity between them and the
GENDET rating of FN. The dissimilarity is that rarely do FNs advance into ratings
such as Data System Technicians (DS), Fire Controlman (FC), or Missile Technician
(MT). Therefore, FNs were categorized with the Boiler Technician (BT), Electrician's
Mate (EM), Machinist's Mate (MM) and the other engineering ratings in DoD occu-
pation code six [Ref. 43].
Table 16. DOD OCCUPATIONAL CODES AND TITLES
DoD Occupational
Code Title
Infantry. Gun Crew, and Seamanship Specialists
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers
2 Communication and Intelligence Specialists
3 Health Care Specialists
4 Other Technical and Allied Specialists
5 Functional Support and Administration
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers
7 Craftsmen
8 Service and Supply Handlers
9 Non-Occupational
Source: DoD Occupational Conversion Manual: Enlisted. Officer; Civilian
E. METHODOLOGY
The data base was analyzed across three distinct time periods; prior to SCP avail-
ability, during SCP availability, and following SCP availability. For the sake of brevity
and clarity, these periods will are numbered as periods I, II, and III, respectively. The
dates that formed the demarcation of the periods were 1 April 1986, when accessions
were allowed to enlist into the DEP under the SCP, and 4 December 1987, when no new
contracts for enlistment under the SCP were to have been written.
For each time period, the number of accessions in each enlistment program was
determined by AFQT category. The number of recruits who enlisted as Airman (AN),
Fireman (FN), or Seaman (SN) were also determined by AFQT category. In a like
manner, the number of recruits by each occupational group were determined by AFQT
category.
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The number of recruits in the enlistment programs, GENDET ratings, and DoD
occupational group was also evaluated by race, ethnic background, and age. The num-
ber of recruits was not evaluated by level of high school education because of the high
percentage of actual and probable high school diploma graduates. An accession cate-
gorized as a probable high school diploma graduate is one who will reasonably be ex-
pected to earn a diploma while in the DEP. uo Ovouje^
Overall, the rate for actual and probable diploma graduates in all enlistment pro-
grams was 89.92 percent. The highest rate (100 percent) occurred in the SCP and the
Nuclear Field programs. The lowest high school graduate rates occurred in the TAR
Enlistment Program (84.52 percent) and the Five-Year Obligation Program (85.80 per-
cent).
The primary purpose of this frequency analysis was to determine if a change oc-
curred in the number of enlistments in any program, GENDET rating, or occupational
code during the three periods. A secondary purpose was to see if the racial, ethnic, or
age mix of the recruits changed over the same periods.
The significance of such a change may give some indication of a market expansion
effect of the SCP. It is possible that a recruit who may have initially been interested in
the SCP eventually enlisted under some other program. This could be the result of
finding out that he was not qualified for participation in the SCP or that some other
program held greater appeal than the SCP.
The changes in the recruitment levels of programs could have taken one of four
forms. The program could have experienced declining levels across the time periods.
Conversely, the program could have experienced increasing levels of enlistment across
the time periods. The programs could have had an increase in accessions from period 1
to period II, followed by a decline in period III. Finally, the program could have had
a decreasing level of enlistment from period I to period II, and then increased in period
III.
The consistent decreasing or increasing level of enlistment is not the focus of this
research. It is hypothesized that whatever the factors that caused the change would only
be marginally affected by the SCP. That is, the SCP would only serve to accelerate or
decelerate the change, but have little impact on the overall direction.
Of more interest were those programs that had experienced a reversal of enlistment
levels (e.g., an increase followed by a decrease, or vice versa). Not all of this change can
be attributed to the availability of the SCP. There were three other enlistment programs
that were introduced during the time period under consideration. These programs were
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the DIVERS, JOBS (Job Oriented Basic Skills), and PSI (Programmed School Input).
These three programs account for a total of 344 enlistees in the sample.
The records of recruits in DIVERS, JOBS, and PSI programs were deleted from the
analysis if it appeared that they would influence the study. This condition existed when
analyzing the frequencies of individual programs and GENDET ratings by AFQT cate-
gories. The enlistment programs are mutually exclusive of the three other programs.
However, when the variables RACE, ETHNIC, and DODOCC were analyzed, or when
analyzing the means of the AFQT percentile scores or SCREEN scores, the accessions
under the three new programs were deleted.
In a similar fashion, the means of the AFQT percentile scores and the SCREEN
scores were also analyzed across the time periods because they provide an indication of
the level of quality. A SCREEN score is the probability that a recruit will complete his
or her first year of enlisted service [Ref. 44: p. 1]. SCREEN is based on grade of edu-
cation, whether or not the applicant has dependents, AFQT score, and the applicant's
age. An enlistee who scores higher on SCREEN has a greater probability of completing
his or her first year of enlistment. Therefore, enlistees with higher scores are more de-
sired by the Navy than those with lower scores, other factors being equal.
A significant change in the mean AFQT score or SCREEN score would indicate a
change in the level of quality within the program being analyzed. The changes of inter-
est are the same in evaluating the means as they were in evaluating the frequencies. The
changes that were closely examined were those that declined from period I to period II
and then increased in period III, or vice versa. As in the frequency analysis, the records
of accessions who enlisted under the DIVERS, JOBS, and PSI programs were deleted
from the analysis.
All analysis was done using the SAS software system for data analysis. A Chi-
square y} test for independence between the two variables under consideration was con-
ducted for all frequency analysis. The null hypothesis is that of no association, or that
there is independence between the row variable and the column variable [Ref. 45: pp.
403-432].
The second statistical test used was for comparing the means of the AFQT
percentile scores and SCREEN scores for each period of the analysis. The t statistic and
















A' is the mean of sample i;
Xj is the mean of sample j;
sf is the variance of sample i;
sj is the variance of sample j;
n, is the number of observations in sample i;
rij is the number of observations in sample j;
t is the computed / statistic;
df is the number of degrees of freedom.
The null and alternate hypotheses are:
HaJCt -Xj*0
if / < i then the null hypothesis is accepted; otherwise the null hypothesis is rejected.
F. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS FINDINGS
The GENDET ratings, enlistment programs, and DoD occupational area code cat-
egories were analyzed by AFQTMG, RACE, ETHNIC, mean AFQT score, and mean
SCREEN score. Only the findings for the GENDET ratings are presented in this
chapter, since the SCP was specifically targeted at these ratings. The results for indi-
vidual enlistment programs and DoD occupational area code categories are provided in
Appendices B through G.
Table 17 on page 53 through Table 28 on page 59 provide the enlistment level
changes of the AN, FN, and SN ratings by AFQT categories and Race/Ethnicity for the
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three time periods under analysis. These tables also provide the changes in the ratings
by mean AFQT percentile score and mean SCREEN score. Each table of rating
enlistment levels by AFQT category includes the Chi-square test statistic (x 2 ), which
measures the independence of the two variables [Ref. 45: pp. 412-413].
The null hypothesis of the Chi-square test is that the two variables are independent.
The null hypothesis is accepted when the x 2 test indicates that the probability that the
two variables are independent is greater than a significance level of 0.01. There was not
enough statistical evidence to accept the null hypothesis of independence between
GEXDET ratings and AFQT category. The Pearson's contingency coefficient (CC) is
provided and is a measure of the strength of the relationship between the two variables
[Ref. 46: p. 482].
1. Airman (AN) Rating
Table 17 shows the changes in enlistment level in the AN rating by AFQT cat-
egory over the time periods. AFQT category I experienced the most change with an
increase of 15 recruits from the first to the second period, followed by a 25 percent de-
crease. AFQT category II had an increase of 134 recruits from period I to period II.
Table 17. ENLISTMENTS INTO THE AIRMAN (AN) RATING BY AFQT
CATEGORY
AFQT Category Period I Period 11 Period 111
I 1 16 12




IIIB 142 295 408





2 28 55 65
CC 0.019 0.069 0.092
Table 18 on page 54 shows the number of new recruits into the AN rating by
racial and ethnic groups. The enlistment levels into this rating increased through the
three periods for whites, blacks, and Hispanics.
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Table 18. ENLISTMENTS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP INTO THE
AIRMAN (AN) RATING
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 257 579 712
Black 72 163 220
Hispanic 33 77 90
n ion f
The quality of Airmen recruits changed significantly over the time period of the
analysis when the mean AFQT percentile score is used as a measure of quality.
Table 19 shows that quality increased significantly between the time period before the
SCP was offered (period I) and the time period in which it was implemented (period II).
There is a significant decrease in the mean AFQT score in the period following the one
in which the SCP was offered. However, the change is not statistically significant be-
tween periods I and III.
Table 19. MEAN AFQT PERCENTILE SCORES FOR AIRMAN (AN) AC-
CESSIONS













t 4.096 3.116 1.661
df 782 1611 672
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 <0.01 >0.10
/
Table 20 on page 55 indicates that the quality of AN recruits, as measured by
the SCREEN score, significantly increased in period II. This increase was also signif-
icant when comparing the mean of period I to that of period III.
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Table 20. MEAN SCREEN SCORES FOR AIRMEN (AN) ACCESSIONS













t 2.837 1.660 1.974
df 441 1746 457
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 > 0.10 < 0.05
2. Fireman (FN) rating
Table 21 shows that the enlistment levels for the FN rating had more pro-
nounced changes in AFQT categories I and II than for category IIIA. Additionally, the
changes in category 1 1 IB, which was not a targeted AFQT category of the SCP, appear
to be more distinct than the changes for Category IIIA.
Table 21. ENLISTMENTS INTO THE FIREMAN (FN) RATING BY AFQT
CATEGORY
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 5 2
11 27 77 49








y 28 55 65
CC 0.019 0.069 0.092
Table 22 on page 56 indicates that there were possibly strong influences in at-
tracting persons into the FN rating. This appears to be the case particularly for blacks,
whose enlistment level more than tripled from period I to period II and then declined
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by about 22 percent in period III. The decrease for whites and Hispanics in this same
period was about 11 and 16 percent, respectively.
Table 22. ENLISTMENTS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP INTO THE FIRE-
MAN (FN) RATING
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 267 349 309
Black 39 146 114
Hispanic 22 51 43
The changes in the mean AFQT percentile scores for FN recruits are not as
significant as they were in the AN rating (see Table 19 on page 54). Table 23 indicates
a significant decrease in the level of recruit quality from period II to period III. The
difference in quality when comparing period I to period III was insignificant.
Table 23. MEAN AFQT PERCENTILE SCORES FOR FIREMAN (FN) AC-
CESSIONS













t 1.409 2.589 1.068
df 763 968 718
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 <0.01 > 0.10
Table 24 on page 57 shows that there was no significant change in the
SCREEN scores of FN recruits over the time period of the analysis.
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Table 24. MEAN SCREEN SCORES FOR FIREMAN (FN) ACCESSIONS













/ 1.419 0.S34 0.873
df 524 968 494
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
3. Seaman (SN) Rating
Table 25 indicates that the enlistment of AFQT category I and II recruits into
the SN rating nearly doubled from period I to period II. Enlistments of category 1 1 1
A
recruits decreased slightly in period II; however, they increased by about 40 percent in
period III.
Table 25. ENLISTMENTS INTO THE SEAMAN (SN) RATING BY AFQT
CATEGORY
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 10 21 22
II 130 228 220
I1IA 144 133 188
II IB 322 352 579





1 28 55 65
cc 0.019 0.069 0.092
The enlistment of whites, blacks, and Hispanics into the SN rating increased
throughout the time of the analysis. There were no reversing trends evident by race or
ethnic group from one period to another, as shown in Table 26 on page 58.
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Table 26. ENLISTMENTS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP INTO THE
SEAMAN (SN) RATING
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 598 619 868
Black 227 365 566
Hispanic 66 93 150
Table 27 shows that there was a significant increase in the mean AFQT scores
of SN recruits from period I to period II. It is also evident that there was a significant
decrease in the level of recruit quality from period II to period III. The recruit mean
AFQT score in period I is not significantly different from that in period III.
Table 27. MEAN AFQT PERCENTILE SCORES FOR SEAMAN (SN) AC-
CESSIONS













t 3.056 4.546 1.241
if 1896 2049 1S74
Level of Signif-
icance
<0.01 <0.01 > 0.10
Table 28 on page 59 indicates that the mean SCREEN score of SN recruits in-
creased significantly from period I to period II and then remained at that level. This is
evident because of the insignificant test statistic between periods II and III. However,
the change in the mean SCREEN score is significant between periods I and III.
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Table 28. MEAN SCREEN SCORES FOR SEAMAN (SN) ACCESSIONS













/ 3.623 0.214 3.7S2
df 1418 1 860 1120
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 > 0.10 < 0.01
4. Summary of Findings
There is an observable increase in the number of enlistments into the AN, FN,
SN ratings during the time when the SCP was offered. The increased enlistments oc-
curred in all of the AFQT categories for all of the GENDET ratings, except in one in-
stance. The level of AFQT category I IIA enlistments into the SN rating decreased by
7.6 percent during period II.
The increase in the number of enlistments into the FN and SN ratings was
greater for blacks than for whites or Hispanics. The number of black men enlisting into
the FN rating more than tripled during the time the SCP was offered. The increase in
the SN ratings for black males during the same period was about 61 percent.
The more notable increases in enlistments of Hispanic men occurred in the AN
and SN ratings. The number of Flispanic enlistments into these ratings more than dou-
bled during period II. The increase in enlistments of Hispanics into the AN rating dur-
ing this same period was about 41 percent.
The mean AFQT percentile scores increased in all three GENDET ratings dur-
ing period II. The largest increase occurred in the AN rating, where the mean AFQT
score increased by about 10 percent. The mean AFQT percentile score for the SN rating
increased by 6.2 percent. The mean AFQT scores between periods I and II for the FN
rating were not statistically different from each other.
During period III, following termination of the SCP, the number of enlistments
of AFQT categories IIIA to IV continued to increase in the AN and SN ratings. The
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changes in the number of AFQT category II AN and SN recruits are nominal (a de-
crease of 2 and 8, respectively). The number of AFQT category I AN recruits decreased
by four (25 percent) in period III. The number of AFQT category I SN recruits in-
creased by one during the same period.
The number of enlistments of young men of all three racial'ethnic groups into
the AN and SN ratings continued to increase in period III. The number of enlistments
into the FN rating declined for all three groups during the same period. The decline of
young black men enlisting was the most notable, at nearly 22 percent.
The mean AFQT percentile scores declined significantly between periods II and
III for all three GENDET ratings. The greatest decline is nearly 8 percent in the SN
rating. The decrease in mean AFQT percentile scores for the AN and FN ratings was
5.8 and 6.4 percent, respectively. No statistically significant change was found in the
mean SCREEN scores of recruits into the three GENDET ratings between periods II
and III.
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V. DATA BASE, METHODOLOGY, AND FINDINGS OF THE
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
A multivariate regression model was developed using the Enlistment iMarket Anal-
ysis data base. The time series, cross-sectional data file contained economic and demo-
graphic information collected quarterly from each of the 41 XRDs for fiscal 1985
through 1988. It was used to model the number of new enlistment contracts of AFQT
category I to IIIA individuals holding a high school diploma and is discussed in greater
detail below.
B. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
This chapter describes the construction of the sample data base, the determinants
used in selecting comparisons, the construction of variables, and the development of a
model. The remainder of the chapter is a discussion of concerning the findings of the
regression analysis.
C. DATA FILE
An econometric model was estimated using the Enlisted Marketing Analysis data
base. The purpose of the model was to obtain the elasticities of the explanatory vari-
ables and not to forecast contracts. This section describes variable construction, model
specification, methodology, and results.
The file contained quarterly data by \RD on the number of new contracts signed
by male recruits in AFQT categories I through 1 1 IB. Since the SCP applied to AFQT
categories I and II high school diploma graduates, the model considered only new con-
tract enlistments in AFQT categories I through IIIA who possessed a high school di-
ploma. It was not possible to limit the new contracts to AFQT categories I and II using
information in the data base.
The military-to-civilian pay ratio for the total NRD labor force rather than for the
17- to 22- year-old population was provided. The recorded unemployment rate was also
for the entire labor force rather than for the youth segment of the labor force. Using the
pay ratio and unemployment rate for the youth population would have provided a more
accurate estimate of their effects. The pay ratio and unemployment rates for the teenage
population are generally higher than those for the general population.
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D. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
1. Variables MALEA and PAY
Two explanatory variables were taken directly from the data base and were not
modified. The first was the MALEA variable. This variable measures the male popu-
lation of the NRD who are high school diploma graduates and who have scored in the
upper 50th percentile on the AFQT.
The second variable provides a measure of the economic conditions in the NRD.
The variable PAY is the military-to-civilian pay ratio. This variable expresses the dif-
ference between military and civilian compensation as a ratio.
2. Variable Construction and Modification








a. Variables UNEMP and ADV1
Two variables were lagged by one quarter (three months). When a variable
is lagged, the value of a variable in a previous quarter is used in the estimation of the
dependent variable for the current quarter. The unemployment rate was lagged because
the decision to enlist is likely to be based, in part, on recent unemployment rates and
not necessarily on the current rate. The rate was also lagged because changes in unem-
ployment rates may have an impact for many months in the future [Ref. 36]. The ad-
vertising expenditures variable was lagged for similar reasons [Ref. 40].
b. Variable BLMAR
The variable for black men in the population of high school graduates who
had AFQT scores in categories I to 1 1 1A was modified to a percentage of the total male
population. This construction permitted an examination of the effect of the black pro-
portion of the population on high-quality enlistments.
c. Variable RECRTR
The number of recruiters in each NRD was expressed as a percentage of the
total male population.
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d. Variables SCP and GIBILL
Two dichotomous variables were created to capture the effect of imple-
mentation of certain programs. The first is the variable SCP, which reflects the imple-
mentation of the Sea College Program. SCP is equal to one between 1 April 1986 and
4 December 1987. The variable is equal to zero at all other times. The second
dichotomous variable created was GIBILL, and its purpose is to reflect the implemen-
tation of the Montgomery G.I. Bill on 1 July 1985. Therefore, the variable is equal to
one after 1 July 1985 (fourth quarter of fiscal 1985) and is equal to zero otherwise.
E. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND FUNCTIONAL FORM
Based on the results of the literature review, the number of new contracts of high
school graduates in AFQT categories I to IIIA (MANC) can be expressed as a function
of the explanatory variables described above:
MANC=J{UNEMP, PA Y, BMAR, ADVl, RECRTR, MA LEA, SCP, GIBILL) (5.1)
The model is expressed as a log-log relationship in order to take advantage of the
constant elasticity properties of the coefficients. In its functional form, the model can
be expressed as:
LOGMANC = Q + ^LOGUXEMP + P 2LOGPA Y+^LOGBMAR + p4LOGADV\
+ P 5LOGREC + (J6LOGMALEA + ^SCP + P8 GIBILL + c
All of the coefficients, except one, are expected to have positive signs. The excep-
tion is for the coefficient of LOGBMAR; this coefficient is expected to have a negative
sign. The expectation that the coefficient of the black population percentage variable
is negative is consistent with the findings of Goldberg and Greenston, where a negative
relationship was found [Ref. 37 : pp. 64-80.]. Table 29 on page 64 presents the eight
explanatory variables and their expected signs in the regression model.
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LOGUNEMP + LOGREC +
LOGPAY — LOGMALEA +
LOG BMAR + SCP +
LOGADVI + GIBILL +
F. METHODOLOGY
A preliminary model was examined for evidence of heteroscedasticity,
multicollinearity, and autocorrelation among the explanatory variables. Preliminary
analysis confirmed the presence of all three conditions. This was not unexpected be-
cause of the time series cross-sectional nature of the data base. A discussion of the type
of condition, its effect on regression estimates, and the method of detecting each condi-
tion is presented below.
Heteroscedasticity exists when the variance disturbance term, /x„ is no longer con-
stant but is conditional on the value of the explanatory variable. This condition yields
biased estimators when using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. This condition
may result in deriving misleading conclusions when using normal statistical testing
techniques [Ref. 47: pp. 316-326].
A preliminary estimation of the model expressed in equation (5.2) was conducted to
obtain the necessary statistics to test the data for heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity
was examined using Spearman's rank correlation test [Ref. 47: pp. 331-332]. In this test,
the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (r
s) is determined by:






d, is the difference in the ranks assigned to two
different characteristics of the i th individual;
N is the number of observations ranked.
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If it is assumed that the population correlation coefficient, p t , is equal to zero, then
the significance of r
s
can be tested using the i test:
where:
t is the / test statistic;
r
s
is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient;
N is the number of observations; and
k is the number of regression coefficients, including the intercept
term, estimated.
The null hypothesis is that the data are heteroscedastic. The null and alternate hy-
potheses for the test can be expressed as:
H :E(rf) = a]
Ha:Etf) + &l
If/ is greater than the critical / value, then the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity is
accepted. Table 30 on page 66 and Table 31 on page 66 presents the probabilities
among the variables that the data are heteroscedastic. If the probability is less than or
equal to 0.05, then the data is considered to be heteroscedastic. Each of the variables
was found to be heteroscedastic.
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Table 30. PROBABILITY OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY AMONG THE VARI-
ABLES
Variable LOGUNEMP LOGPAY LOGBMAR LOGREC
LOGUNEMP 0.0000 0.5671 0.0436 0.0001
LOGPAY 0.5671 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
LOGBMAR 0.0436 0.0001 0.0000 0.3468
LOGREC 0.0001 0.0001 0.3468 0.0000
LOGADV1 0.0740 0.3797 0.7499 0.2425
LOGMALEA 0.0001 0.0001 0.8818 0.0001
SCP 0.9640 0.7723 0.3146 0.3047
GIBILL o.oooi o.oooi 0.8229 0.0001
Table 31. PROBABILITY OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY AMONG THE VARI-
ABLES
Variable LOGADVI LOGMALEA SCP GIBILL
LOGUNEMP 0.0740 0.0001 0.9640 0.0001
LOGPAY 0.3797 0.0001 0.7723 0.0001
LOGBMAR 0.7499 0.88 IS 0.3146 0.8229
LOGREC 0.2425 0.0001 0.3047 0.0001
LOGADV1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
LOGMALEA o.oooi 0.0000 0.0001 0.000
1
SCP O.oooi o.oooi 0.0000 0.0001
GIBILL 0.0001 o.oooi 0.0001 0.0000
Multicollinearity is the presence of a linear relationship among some or all of the
explanatory variables of a regression model. Multicollinearity yields regression coeffi-
cients that have large standard errors and poor accuracy [Ref. 47: pp. 283-286]. A test
for multicollinearity was conducted using a condition number that is defined as the ratio
of the maximum to the minimum eigenvalues among the regressors [Ref. 47: pp.
301-302]. A condition number greater than 1,000 is considered to be an indication of
severe multicollinearity. The condition number for the preliminary regression model was
2,782.
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Autocorrelation is defined, by Gujarati, as "correlation between members of series
of observations ordered in time or space" [Ref. 47: pp. 353-354]. Autocorrelation was
tested using the Durbin-Watson d statistic [Ref. 47: pp.375-379]. The computed d , or
d, was 1.329 while the critical d statistic at the 0.05 level of significance was 1.697.
Therefore, there was evidence that positive autocorrelation existed. OLS estimation in
the presence of autocorrelation yields estimates that are linear, unbiased, and consistent,
but whose variances are no longer efficient or at a minimum.
The presence of autocorrelation led to the conclusion that the error term of the
model was following a first-order autoregressive process [Ref. 48: pp. 448-450]. This








is the first-order autoregressive error term;
p is the autocorrelation parameter;
p, is a disturbance term, since:
s




f = p(pe,-2 + P t-\) + Pi = P C i-2 + PPi-\ + Pi
and since:
£
f_ 2 = PZ,-3 + Pt-1
then:
£ = P £;_3 + P P- t-2 + PPt-l + Pi
which can ultimately be expressed as:
oo
;
/ = / PPl-S (5.12)
5=0
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This expression states that the first-order autoregressive error term is a linear com-
bination of the current and preceding error terms.
G. REGRESSION ANALYSIS FINDINGS
Estimation of the model was conducted using the SAS procedure TSCSREG, or
time series cross-sectional regression. This procedure permits parameter estimates to be
studied under one of three error structures. The Parks Method assumes a first-order
autoregressive error structure with contemporaneous collinearity between cross-sections
and heteroscedasticity in its estimation. When the Parks method is used, the regression
parameters are estimated by generalized least squares [Ref. 49].
The model was also estimated using OLS. This was done so that the regression co-
efficient estimates obtained by one method might be compared to those obtained by the
second method. The purpose of this comparison was to determine the range of values
for the true SCP elasticity.
I. Model Estimation with LOGPAY as an Explanatory Variable
Table 32 on page 69 presents the results of the regression using the two meth-
ods. The regression coefficients are indicated as /?, and the standard error for each co-
efficient is also provided. The probability that the coefficient is equal to zero is indicated
in the column labeled prob >
1
1 |. If the value is less than the significance level of 0.05,
then the coefficient is considered to be significantly different than zero.
Additionally, the F statistic and the probability of obtaining a greater F statistic
are indicated in the table. The F statistic is used to test the hypothesis that all regression
coefficients, except the intercept term, are jointly equal to zero. If the probability of
obtaining a greater F statistic is less than 0.05, then all the coefficients are jointly sig-
nificant and different from zero.
The final measure of goodness of fit is the mean square error (MSE). The MSE
derives its value from the combined effects of bias and sampling variation of the pa-
rameter estimate relative to the true parameter [Ref. 48 : p. 395]. For the regression
models, a minimum MSE is desired [Ref. 48: pp.422-425]. The more conventional
measures of fit for OLS estimation is provided in the R 2 statistic which is available for
the OLS estimates but not for the Parks estimates.
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Table 32. RESULTS OF REGRESSION USING OLS AND PARKS METHODS
Variable
OLS Method Parks Metho d
A Std Err
prob
>\t\ A Std Err
prob
INTERCEPT 4.867 0.200 0.0001 5.068 0.044 0.000
LOGUNEMP 0.102 0.043 0.018 0.045 0.007 0.000
LOGPAY 0.159 0.143 0.267 - 0.057 0.026 0.031
LOG BMAR - 0.046 0.012 0.0002 0.003 0.002 0.155
LOGREC 0.116 0.016 0.0001 0.007 0.004 0.076
LOGADV1 0.002 0.008 0.812 - 0.006 0.001 0.000
LOGMALEA 0.119 0.012 0.0001 0.035 0.002 0.000
SCP 0.071 0.030 0.018 - 0.008 0.005 0.082
GIBILL 0.143 0.039 0.0002 0.173 0.008 0.000
R 2 0.20S
F statistic 21.252
prob > F 0.0001
MSE 0.091 0.371
N 656 656
Table 32 shows that for the OLS estimates, all coefficients are of the expected
sign and are significant except for the LOGPAY and the LOGADV1 variables. Addi-
tionally, the estimates are jointly significant. The elasticity of the SCP is positive and
significant.
The Parks method yields somewhat different results, however. The SCP and
LOGPAY are estimated to have a negative effect on new enlistment contracts. The SCP
coefficient is no longer significantly different from zero, which is the same as saying that
in this model, the SCP has no influence on the enlistment decision. The pay variable is
not only negative but has now become significant.
The advertising coefficient also changes signs from positive in the OLS estimates
to negative in the Parks method. The black male population rate also changes signs and
significance. In the OLS method the rate was negative and significant. That is, as the
black male population rate increased, the number of new enlistment contracts is ex-
pected to decrease. In the Parks method, the LOGBMAR variable is no longer signif-
icant.
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Of particular concern was the changing of the sign of the pay variable. It has
long been established that as the military-to-civilian wage ratio increased, the number
of new contracts could be expected to increase. A review of methodology did not reveal
any reason for the change in the sign of this variable. However, discussions with a Navy
Recruiting Command representative revealed that the same effect on the pay variable
has occurred in their previous analyses. Navy Recruiting Command consequently de-
veloped a new pay variable [Ref. 50]. This new pay variable was not available for this
research.
2. Model Estimation without LOGPAY as an Explanatory Variable
Based upon Navy Recruiting Command's experience, the pay variable was
dropped from the model and the regressions were reestimated. Table 33 presents a
comparison of the results for the OLS and Parks estimates. Test statistics in this table
perform the same functions as in Table 32 on page 69.
Table 33. RESULTS OF REGRESSION USING OLS AND PARKS METHODS
WITHOUT LOGPAY
Variable








INTERCEPT 4.9S3 0.199 0.0001 5.079 0.042 0.000
LOGUNEMP 0.107 0.043 0.013 0.047 0.007 0.000
LOG BMAR - 0.047 0.012 0.0002 0.004 0.0O2 0.023
LOGREC 0.116 0.016 0.0001 0.006 0.003 0.06
LOGADV1 0.002 O.OOS 0.802 - 0.006 0.001 0.0001
LOGMA LEA 0.115 0.012 0.0001 0.034 0.002 0.000
SCP 0.071 0.030 0.018 - 0.009 0.005 0.064
GIBILL 0.150 0.038 0.0001 0.172 0.008 0.000
R 2 0.207
F statistic 24.103




The black male variable parameter estimate again changes signs from the OLS
method to the Parks method, but remains significant. The advertising coefficient also
changes signs, and it too remains significant.
The G.I. Bill parameter estimate in both models, and in using both methods,
remains fairly consistent and significant. The elasticity ranges from 0.143 to 0.173, in-
dicating that the G.I. Bill has a positive effect in attracting youth to military service.
The SCP elasticities range from to 0.071. This indicates that the SCP had a
slight positive effect in generating new enlistment contracts. This partly explains and
confirms the rise in enlistment levels seen in the GENDET ratings. The small magnitude
of the coefficient may be attributed to the fact that the SCP was targeted toward a select
segment of the youth population.
3. Summary of Findings
The SCP has a positive effect on the number of high-quality (high school di-
ploma graduates who score in AFQT category I through II IA) new contract enlistments
when using OLS estimation. The SCP has a negative effect on new contract enlistments
when the model is estimated using Parks method. However, the effect is not statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. If the level of significance is changed to 0.10, then the SCP
has a negative elasticity of 0.009, or less than 1 percent.
- a oo git,
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. GENERAL
This chapter describes the conclusions drawn as the result of this research. The
conclusions are presented categorically in response to the primary and secondary re-
search questions that were posed in Chapter 1. The policy implications of the conclu-
sions are then discussed along with potential areas of future research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Effect of the SCP on the Targeted Ratings
The primary research question is to evaluate the effect that the SCP may have
had on the targeted GENDET ratings of Airman (AN), Fireman (FN), and Seaman
(SX). The changes in the number of enlistments in each of the ratings over the three
periods is used as a measure of the effect of the SCP. Period I is the period before the
SCP was offered; period II refers to when the SCP was offered; and period III refers to
the time following termination of the SCP.
Table 17 on page 53, Table 21 on page 55, and Table 25 on page 57 show the
changes in the number of enlistments in the three ratings. It is evident that there were
substantial changes in the number of enlistments, particularly in the fireman rating. The
number of total enlistments for FN increased by about 59 percent between periods I and
II and then declined by a little more than 10 percent in period III. This change was
spread out over AFQT categories I, II, and IIIA; however, most of the change occurred
in category II.
The number of enlistments into the FN rating by AFQT category II youth
nearly tripled from period I to period II. The number then decreased by a little more
than 36 percent in period III.
Of equal interest is the change in the number of enlistments of AFQT category
1 1 IB FNs, a category not eligible for the SCP. Beginning at a level of 124 enlistments
in period I, the number increases by nearly 64 percent in period II and then decreases
to 177 enlistments in period III. It cannot be concluded that the increase of AFQT
category IIIB recruits reflects a market expansion effect because persons in this group
may have been influenced by enlistment programs other than the SCP.
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The effect of the SCP on the other two GENDET ratings, while not as dramatic,
is notable. The number of AFQT category II SN recruits increased from 130 during
period I to 228 in period II. This represents an increase of more than 75 percent. The
number of enlistments decreased during period III by only about 3.5 percent.
The least affected of the three ratings is the AN rating. The number of
enlistments of AFQT category I recruits did increase from one to 16 between periods I
and II, and then decreased 25 percent in period III. However, the small cell sizes in the
analysis make it imprudent to draw specific conclusions about the effect of the SCP on
enlistments into this rating.
It is concluded that the SCP did have a positive influence on the number of
enlistments of AFQT category I and II males into the FN and SN ratings. This con-
clusion is also supported by the results of the regression of the new contract enlistment
model. These results are contained in Table 32 on page 69 and in Table 33 on page 70
The tables show that elasticity of the SCP ranged from zero to about 0.07 when esti-
mating the total number of new contract enlistments of high school graduates who
scored in AFQT categories I through IIIA. The positive coefficient of the SCP variable
suggests that the SCP partially influenced the changes in the number of enlistments into
the GENDET ratings in period II. It is not possible to conclude that the SCP is re-
sponsible for all of the changes shown.
2. The Effect of the SCP on the Quality of Enlistments into Targeted Ratings
A secondary research question was to determine if the SCP had any effect on
the level of the quality of recruits who enlisted into the targeted ratings. This effect was
measured by comparing the mean AFQT percentile scores and the mean SCREEN
scores of recruits in each of the three ratings over the three periods. Table 19 on page
54, Table 23 on page 56, and Table 27 on page 58 present the results of the comparison
of the mean AFQT percentile scores. Table 20 on page 55, Table 24 on page 57, and
Table 28 on page 59 presents the results of the comparison of the mean SCREEN
scores. The following discussion summarizes the results of analysis by individual ratings.
a. Changes in the Level of Recruit Quality in the AN rating
Table 19 on page 54 shows that the recruit mean AFQT percentile score
increased from about 45 to about 49.5 between periods I and II. This increase in the
level of recruit quality was significant at the 0.01 level. Also, the level of recruit quality
decreased significantly after the discontinuation of the SCP in period III. There is no
statistically significant difference in the level of recruit quality between periods I and II
when the SCP was not offered.
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The mean SCREEN scores of AN recruits also changed significantly, as
seen in Table 20 on page 55. The recruit mean SCREEN score increased significantly
between periods I and II; however, it did not change significantly between periods II and
III. This indicates that the SCP may have attracted some high-quality recruits, as
measured by the SCREEN score, but that discontinuation of the program had little ef-
fect on the mean SCREEN score of recruits.
With respect to the AN rating, while the SCP may have had an inconclusive
effect on the number of enlistments, it is apparent that the SCP played a role in at-
tracting high-quality male youths into the rating. The recruits who enlisted in period III
were no more or less likely to separate from the Navy before completing 12 months of
service than those who enlisted in period II, as measured by the mean SCREEN score.
Those who enlisted in period II were of a higher quality based on the significantly dif-
ferent mean AFQT percentile scores of the recruits between periods II and III.
b. Changes in the Level of Recruit Quality in the FN Rating
While the most significant changes in the number of enlistments occur in
this rating, the changes in the level of quality were hardly significant. The only change
that is significant is in the mean AFQT percentile score. Table 23 on page 56 presents
this information.
There is no significant difference between the mean AFQT scores of recruits
in period I and the scores of recruits in periods II or III. However, there is a significant
decrease in the mean AFQT score of recruits who enlisted during period II, when com-
pared to those who enlisted in period III. This may indicate that the SCP did not help
to attract high-quality youths into this rating. It may also indicate that when
enlistments under the SCP ceased, high-quality youths enlisted into programs other than
GENDET FN.
c. Changes in the Level of Recruit Quality in the SN Rating
The SN rating also experienced changes in recruit quality similar to that of
the AN rating. Table 27 on page 58 shows that the mean AFQT percentile score of SN
recruits increased significantly from about 44 in period I to about 46.7 in period II. The
mean score also decreased significantly to about 43 in period III. There is no significant
difference between the mean AFQT score in period I and that in period III.
This indicates that during the time that the SCP was offered, a significantly
higher quality recruit, as measured by the mean AFQT percentile score, was enlisting.
When comparing the level of recruit quality both before and after the period when the
SCP was offered, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between the two.
74
The level of recruit quality, as measured by the mean SCREEN score, is
provided in Table 28 on page 59. It can be seen that the recruits who enlisted in period
II were significantly less likely to separate before completing 12 months of service than
were those who enlisted in period I. Again, as in the AN rating, those who enlisted in
period III were no more or less likely to separate prior to completing of 12 months of
service than were those in period II. Therefore, there is an increase in the number of
enlistments and the level of recruit quality in the SN rating during the time the SCP was
offered.
d. Remaining Research Questions
The secondary research questions that remain to be answered deal with the
effect that the SCP may have had in the number of enlistments and the level of recruit
quality in other enlistment programs and DoD occupational areas. It is not possible to
isolate the effect of the SCP on these areas, given the data bases used in this research.
Attempts to analyze the effect of the SCP in these areas resulted in small
cell sizes for some of the enlistment programs and occupational areas. It was also not
possible for the purposes of this research to account for all of the changes to enlistment
program policies. These would have had a profound effect on the number of enlistments
and the level of recruit quality into the affected program.
Therefore, no conclusions are made regarding the impact of the SCP on the
number of enlistments and the level of recruit quality into these programs and occupa-
tional areas. Appendices B through G present the results of analysis for these two areas.
3. Summary of Conclusions
This research suggests that the Navy Sea College Program was reasonably suc-
cessful in accomplishing the following:
• Attracting youths into the GENDET ratings, particularly into the Fireman (FN)
rating. The program helped to attract enlistments into the AN and SN ratings, but
to a lesser degree.
• Attracting higher-quality youth into the SN and AN rating. However, the SCP had
limited success in influencing the quality of recruits entering the FN rating.
• Generating new contract enlistments, based upon the regression of the enlistment
model.
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCLUSIONS
Since the Navy Sea College Program appears to have been successful in generating
enlistments, certain decisions must be made as to future applications of similar pro-
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grams. The issues can be divided into three broad categories. The three categories are
program eligibility, program applicability, and program cost.
Navy manpower planners will have to decide on what type of recruit is desired. The
decision to limit program eligibility to persons in AFQT categories I and II may result
in underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities.
In addition, Navy manpower planners will have to decide whether the purpose of a
future educational benefits program should be to attract highly qualified recruits or act
as a skill channeler or, accomplish both. The SCP showed that, while it was able to in-
crease the enlistment level in the FN rating, it was also able to raise the level of recruit
quality in the SN and AN ratings. Therefore, military manpower planners will have to
decide if one or the other purpose should receive the greater emphasis.
Finally, the potential value of a future educational benefit program will have to
measured in terms of both its costs and its benefits. This may become particularly im-
portant in the face of budget retrenchment. It was not possible to measure this effect
within the scope of this research.
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This research represents an initial effort to understand the effect of the Sea College
Program. As such, it tends to raise more questions than it answers. Some of these
questions include:
• Was the SCP cost-effective? This would require tracking the SCP enlistees once
they leave the Navy and begin using their benefits.
• Did the SCP have any effect on relieving manpower shortages in critical skill
ratings? This would require that the SCP recruit be tracked from completion of
general apprenticeship training through advancement to pay grades E-4 or E-5.
• How effective was advertising for the SCP? There is little known about the how
the SCP was advertised and whether the advertising was effective. This may be
important because possible budget limitations in the future may. require that
greater fiscal care be exercised by all participants in the enlistment process.
• How effective was the SCP, compared with other enlistment programs, in attracting
recruits? This might be limited to comparing the SCP with other programs that
enlisted recruits into the reserves.
• How many SCP enlistees did not complete their first term of enlistment?
• How many recruits who entered the Navy during the time the SCP was offered
knew of the benefit program and yet enlisted into some other program? This might
give some indication of the market expansion effect of the program.
• Is it possible to design a test program that would accurately measure the effect of
an educational benefits program on enlistments while ensuring that the educational
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assistance program provides equal access to all potential recruits? This means de-
signing a test that does not give the appearance to an outsider of being a test.
The value of an educational benefit program for increasing the enlistment of high-
quality young men and women has been shown time and again, not only in surveys of
youths and new recruits, but also in empirical studies of the Army College Fund. A
well-developed and carefully managed successor to the Navy Sea College Program would
serve as a valuable recruiting tool for the Navy into the 1990s.
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Infantry. Gun Crew, and
Seamanship Specialties
AN, BM, GM, GMG, GMM,
QM. SN
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers
AX, AT, AQ, DS, ET, FC, FT,
FTB. FTG, MT, OTA, OTM,




AC, AW, CT, E\V, OS, OT, RM,
SM
3 Health Care Specialists DN, DT. HM, HN
4
Other Technical and Allied Spe-
cialists
AG, DM, ML', PH
5
Functional Support and Admin-
istration
AZ, AK, DP. DK, IS, JO, LN,




AB, ABE. ABF. ABII. AE. AD,
AO, AM, AME, AMH, AMS.
AS, ASE, ASM, BT, CM. EM,
EN, FN, GS, GSE, GSM, IM,
IC, MM, MN, OM, \VT
7 Craftsmen BU. CE. CN, DC. EA. EO, HT,
LI, MR, ML, PM. SW, UT
8 Service and Supply Handlers PR. MA. MS. SH
9 Non-Occupational Students. Patients. Prisoners
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APPENDIX B. NUMBER OF ENLISTMENTS INTO RECRUITING
PROGRAMS OTHER THAN GENDET RATINGS AND THE SEA
COLLEGE PROGRAM
Enlistment into the Advanced Electronics Field (AEF) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 17 66 86









r 2()96 3413 4960
cc 0.559 0.570 0.565
Enlistment into the Active Mariner (AVI) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 7 14 11
II 125 167 161
II I 133 126 123
1 1 IB 114 116 160





2 2096 3413 4960
CC 0.559 0.570 0.565
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Enlistment into the Advanced Technical Field (ATF) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period 11 Period III
I 13 14 21










2 2096 3413 4960
CC 0.559 0.570 0.565
Enlistment into the Apprenticeship Training (ATP) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 5 8 9
11 55 112 109
IIIA 110 156 178
IIIB 226 394 548





1 2096 3413 4900
CC 0.559 0.570 0.565
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Enlistment into the Nuclear Field (NF) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 90 141 219







Enlistments 393 520 816
X
2 2096 3413 4960
cc 0.559 0.570 0.565
Enlistment into the Seafarer (SF) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period 1
1
Period III
I 10 12 25
II 167 191 304
II I 199 223 345
IIIB 37S 483 693





: 2096 3413 4960
CC 0.559 0.570 0.565
Enlistment into the School Guarantee (SG) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 30 46 76
II 460 599 977
IIIA 416 661 1180
IIIB 507 912 1479





2 2096 3413 4960
CC 0.559 0.570 0.565
Enlistment into the TAR Enlisted Program (TEP) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 4 3 5
II 30 74 69
IIIA 35 70 45
IIIB 24 45 40





2 2<)96 3413 4960
CC 0.559 0.570 0.565
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Enlistment into the Five Year Obligation (5YO) Program by AFQT Category
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 2 10 9




IIIB 20 74 119





2 2096 3413 4960
cc 0.559 0.570 0.565
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APPENDIX C. MEAN AFQT PERCENTILE AND SCREEN SCORES OF
RECRUITS BY ENLISTMENT PROGRAM
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Advanced Electronics Field (AEF) Program Ac-
cessions













i 2.471 0.521 2.197
4f 1057 16<)3 936
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.05 > 0.10 < 0.05
Mean SCREEN Scores for Advanced Electronics Field (AEF) Program Accessions













t 1.180 0.374 0.681
df 1060 1801 1418
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 >0.10 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Active Mariner (AM) Program Accessions













t 1.532 2.155 0.635
if 818 909 858
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 < 0.05 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for Active Mariner (AM) Program Accessions














i 0.084 0.392 0.486
df 819 SS6 834
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 >0.10 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Advanced Technical Field (ATF) Program Ac-
cessions














i 1 .068 1.589 2.834
df 243 273 257
Level of Signif-
icance
>0.10 > 0.10 < 0.01
Mean SCREEN Scores for Advanced Technical Field (ATF) Program Accessions













t 0.020 0.070 0.039
if 228 281 212
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Apprenticeship Training (ATP) Program Ac-
cessions













t 0.095 2.065 1.690
df 1229 1930 1071
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 <0.05 <0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for Apprenticeship Training (ATP) Program Accessions













/ 0.306 1.417 0.884
df 1201 1964 1071
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Nuclear Field (NF) Program Accessions














t 1.873 0.614 2.662
if 855 1046 743
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.10 > 0.10 <0.01
Mean SCREEN Scores for Nuclear Field (NF) Program Accessions













/' 0.554 0.261 0.058
df 876 1087 1092
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Seafarer (SF) Program Accessions













t 0.662 0.949 0.193
df 2192 2692 2179
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 >0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for Seafarer (SF) Program Accessions













i 0.640 1.223 1.792
df 2094 2413 1755
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 < 0.10
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Mean AFQ'I Percentile Scores for School Guarantee (SG) Program Accessions
AFQT Period I Period II Period III













/ 4.077 0.182 4.603
df 3151 4922 2646
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 > 0.10 < 0.01
Mean SCRHHX Scores for School Guarantee (SG) Program Accessions














/ 1.120 1.112 0.365
df 3232 4710 2600
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for TAR Enlisted Program (TEP) Accessions













i 0.294 0.546 0.733
if 186 326 214
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for TAR Enlisted Program (TEP) Accessions













t 0.224 2.081 1.898
if 182 349 184
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 <0.05 < 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for Five Year Obligation (5YO) Program Accessions














t 1.274 1.719 0.136
df 128 517 108
Level of Signif-
icance
>0.10 < 0.10 > 0.10
Mean SCRFEN Scores for Five Year Obligation (5YO) Program Accessions














t 0.512 0.198 0.394
df 116 552 107
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
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APPENDIX D. ENLISTMENTS OF RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUPS BY
ENLISTMENT PROGRAM
Enlistments by Racial/Ethnic Group into the Advanced Electronics Field (AEF)
Program
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 431 704 962
Black 31 39 72
Hispanic 21 34 86
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into the Active Mariner (AM) Program
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 321 367 371
Black 47 59 93
Hispanic 26 31 34
Enlistments by Racial'Ethnic Group into the Advanced Technical Field (ATF) Pro-
cram
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 108 118 229
Black 5 6 21
Hispanic 3 7 29
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Enlistments by Racial; Ethnic Group into the Apprenticeship Training (ATP) Pro-
gram
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 422 586 795
Black 124 310 385
Hispanic 46 84 110
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into the Nuclear Field (NF) Program
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 366 492 760
Black 15 14 37
Hispanic 20 28 52
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into the Seafarer (SF) Program
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 754 822 1208
Black 217 359 548
Hispanic 77 124 190
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Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into the School Guarantee (SG) Program
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 1212 1778 2986
Black 206 499 838
Hispanic 91 233 381
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into the TAR Enlisted Program (TEP)
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 82 171 139
Black 10 21 16
Hispanic 5 15 8
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into the Five Year Obligation (5YO) Program
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 60 211 2S8
Black 7 27 61
Hispanic 8 18 34
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APPENDIX E. NUMBER OF ENLISTMENTS BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL
AREA CODE
Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 14 44 40




11 IB 634 889 1213





2 1731 2165 3446
CC 0.522 0.483 0.496
Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 1
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 14 61 87
II 354 545 763
I II 113 175 266






2 1731 2165 3446
CC 0.522 0.483 0.496
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Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 2
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 15 25 35
11 154 250 393
IIIA 113 188 358
IIIB 96 178 265





2 1731 2165 3446
cc 0.522 0.483 0.496
Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 3
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 6 9 16




IIIB 76 13S 217





2 1731 2165 3446
cc 0.522 0.483 0.496
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Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 4
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 2 1 1
11 9 18 33
IIIA 3 14 19






1 1731 2165 3446
cc 0.522 0.483 0.496
Enlistment into DoD Occupatioanl Area Code 5
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 11 15 19




IIIB 32 73 124





2 1731 2165 3446
CC 0.522 0.4S3 0.496
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Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 6
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 26 26 48




II IB 224 383 666





2 1731 2165 3446
cc 0.522 0.483 0.496
Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 7
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
I 5 4
II 36 35 61
II I 48 51 106
IIIB 58 97 123





2 1731 2 1 65 3446
CC 0.522 0.483 0.496
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Enlistment into DoD Occupational Area Code 8
AFQT Category Period I Period II Period III
1 1 1 1
II 20 32 38
I IIA 34 69 73
IIIB 95 139 239





2 1731 2165 3446
CC 0.522 0.483 0.496
100
APPENDIX F. MEAN AFQT PERCENTILE AND SCREEN SCORES OF
RECRUITS BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA CODES
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code Accessions













t 4.702 5.591 0.304
df 3867 5047 358S
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 < 0.01 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code Accessions













i 4.751 1.223 4.160
df 2604 5039 2317
Level of Signif-
icance
<0.01 >0.10 < 0.01
101
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 1 Accessions














i 0.782 0.663 1.441
df 1157 1790 1013
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 1 Accessions















i 0.261 1 .024 1.012
df 836 1994 1165
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 >0.10 > 0.10
102
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 2 Accessions













i 1.018 0.043 1.142
df 817 1384 673
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 2 Program Accessions













i 1.941 2.388 0.399
df 1023 892 753
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.10 <0.05 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 3 Accessions














/ 2.451 0.276 2.439
df 442 652 378
Level of Signif-
icance
<0.05 > 0.10 < 0.05
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 3 Accessions













t 0.298 1.278 1.198
df 313 818 439
Level of Signif-
icance
>0.10 > 0.1.0 > 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 4 Accessions













t 1.618 1.052 0.912
df 25 76 21
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 4 Accessions













t 1.278 0.428 1.004
df 23 so 22
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 >0.10 > 0.10
[05
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 5 Accessions














I 1.696 0.581 2.378
df 591 804 581
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.10 >0.10 <0.05
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 5 Accessions













f 1.234 0.578 1.884
df 5S5 795 560
Level of Signif-
icance
>0.10 > 0.10 < 0.10
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Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 6 Accessions













t 4.386 1.272 5.866
df 1510 2278 1304
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 > 0.10 < 0.01
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 6 Accessions













i 3.613 1.627 2.468
if 16S2 2216 1498
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 > 0.10 <0.05
107
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 7 Accessions













t 0.704 1.159 0.300
df 329 401 299
Fevel of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
Mean SCRFEX Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 7 Accessions













t 2.646 0.039 2.995
4f 267 440 432
Level of Signif-
icance
< 0.01 >0.10 <0.01
108
Mean AFQT Percentile Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 8 Accessions













/ 1.000 2.444 0.969
df 33 l) 573 309
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 <0.05 > 0.10
Mean SCREEN Scores for DoD Occupational Area Code 8 Accessions













/ 0.901 0.523 0.527
df 396 501 324
Level of Signif-
icance
> 0.10 > 0.10 > 0.10
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APPENDIX G. ENLISTMENTS OF RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUPS BY DOD
OCCUPATIONAL AREA CODE
Enlistments by RacialEthnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period 11 Period III
White 1237 1649 2010
Black 352 694 927
Hispanic 128 234 302
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 1
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 459 777 1065
Black 29 50 93
Hispanic 29 51 106
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 2
Racial' Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 313 527 855
Black 61 131 214
Hispanic 32 64 94
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Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 3
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 160 216 364
Black 31 83 130
Hispanic 20 29 61
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 4
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 13 32 49
Black 1 4 5
Hispanic 10
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 5
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 207 266 374
Black 38 99 117
Hispanic S 31 57
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Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 6
Racial/Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 626 911 1433
Black 61 127 292
Hispanic 37 111 169
Enlistments by Racial/Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 7
Racial, Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 140 181 278
Black 5 4 18
Hispanic 5 8 9
Enlistments by Racial Ethnic Group into DoD Occupational Area Code 8
Racial Ethnic
Group Period I Period II Period III
White 116 157 215
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